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Statement Showing the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court:
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review:
Issue One: Whether the district court erred in permitting an attorney who was
suspended for intentionally and/or knowingly engaging in professional misconduct
involving dishonesty, to petition to stay a portion of the suspension and instead submit to
a period of probation. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional
misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah
Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of
discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This
issue arose for the first time in the trial court's Ruling and Order re: Sanctions. (R. 245258)
Issue Two: Whether the district court erred in permitting an attorney who was
suspended for intentionally and/or knowingly engaging in professional misconduct
involving dishonesty and there were substantial aggravating factors and no mitigating
factors, to petition to stay a portion of the suspension and instead submit to a period of
probation. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in
attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the
evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue arose for
the first time in the trial court's Ruling and Order re: Sanctions. (R. 245-258)
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules
Rule 2.

Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 3.

Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 4.

Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 6.

Aggravation
Sanctions.

and

Mitigation, Standards for

Imposing

Lawyer

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case.
The Course of Proceedings: The case originated in a disciplinary action against
J. Keith Henderson. (R. 1-12)

On December 13, 2005, the court entered Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment against Henderson as to

his
1

violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 191-194) The District Court entered
its Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions on February 6, 2006. (R. 245-258) Pursuant to Rule
52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the OPC filed a Motion to Amend Ruling and
Order re: Sanctions on February 21, 2006. (R. 260-261) The court entered an Order
Amending Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions on April 17, 2006. (290-292)

This appeal
4

ensued. (R. 294-295) This case was consolidated with In re Crawley.
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?

Disposition in the Trial Court: The trial court suspended Henderson for a period
of twelve months, with leave to petition the court to stay all but three months of the
suspension upon certain conditions. (R. 258) The order amending the ruling changed
the provision of the RLDD pursuant to which Henderson must apply for reinstatement,
clarified that the suspension period would be one year, whether or not a portion of the
actual suspension is stayed, and ordered Henderson to comply with Rule 26(b) of the
RLDD with respect to winding up his practice. (R. 291)

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
In September 1994, [William] Blakley was involved in an on-the-job accident
when the truck he was driving overturned.

(R. 192) Blakley retained Henderson to

pursue unpaid worker's compensation claims Blakley had filed with the worker's
compensation insurance carrier, American Insurance Company ("American Insurance").
(R. 192)
Henderson knew that Blakley was pursuing a personal injury claim against the
other driver in the accident, but did not inform Blakley that a settlement in the personal
injury case could affect his worker's compensation claim. (R. 192) Around January
2000, Blakley's personal injury attorney settled the personal injury claim against the
third-party defendant in the accident. (R. 192)
Without determining the status of Blakely's personal injury case, in early
February 2000, Henderson filed an Application for Hearing requesting a hearing before
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the Labor Commission for the State of Utah ("Labor Commission") regarding Blakley's
unpaid worker's compensation claims. (R. 192)
In mid-March 2000, American Insurance filed an Amended Response to
Application for Hearing asserting a counterclaim for reimbursement for past payments
and offset of future payments to Blakley because he had received settlement proceeds
from the defendant in his personal injury case. (R. 192-193)
The Labor Commission set a June 2, 2000 hearing on Blakley's worker's
compensation claim. (R. 193) Before the date of the hearing, Henderson did not give
Blakley a copy of American Insurance's response or its amended response. (R. 193)
Henderson met with Blakley just prior to the hearing and as they traveled to it. (R. 193)
Before and after the hearing, Henderson did not fully explain to Blakley how the
settlement in his personal injury case would affect his pending and future worker's
compensation claims. (R. 193)
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") continued the Labor Commission hearing
without date to see if the parties could reach a settlement regarding the amount of
compensation that American Insurance would receive. (R. 193)
After the June Labor Commission hearing, Blakley did not hear again from
Henderson until he received a letter from Henderson dated November 30, 2000, which
told him for the first time that American Insurance had a right to the third-party personal
injury settlement and Blakley was not entitled to recover a worker's compensation
award. (R. 193)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On November 9, 2000, Henderson had been suspended from the practice of law
for two years, with all but six months stayed. (R. 194)

Henderson failed to notify

Blakley that Henderson had been suspended and could no longer represent Blakley.
(R. 194) Henderson also failed to inform Blakley of the need to retain new counsel or
represent himself pro se in the matter. (R. 194) Nor did Henderson provide Blakley
with a copy of Blakley's file. (R. 194) Additionally, Henderson failed to notify Blakley
that the next hearing in his case was set for February 27, 2001 and that Blakley should
attend it. (R. 194)
On February 27, 2001, the ALJ conducted a status conference hearing in
Blakley's case. (R. 194) When Henderson failed to appear for the hearing, the ALJ
telephoned him. (R. 194) During the telephone conversation, Henderson informed the
ALJ that he had withdrawn from the case because it had settled. (R. 194) As of that
date, however, Blakley had not reached a settlement with American Insurance. (R.
194) The ALJ directed Henderson to file a withdrawal of counsel within ten days so the
case could move forward.

(R. 194)

Henderson did not submit his withdrawal of

counsel until October 15, 2002—more than eighteen months later. (R. 195)
Based upon these facts, the District Court in the case underlying this appeal
found and concluded that Henderson violated

Rules

1.1

(Competence),

1.4

(Communication), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a) (Candor to
the Tribunal), and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as
alleged in the OPC's Complaint. (R. 194)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The disciplinary matter against Henderson proceeded to a sanctions hearing on
January 30, 2006. (R. 245) Each side briefed their positions in advance. (R. 199-226; R.
230-240) The District Court received testimony and exhibits, and on February 6, 2006,
entered its Ruling and Order re: Sanctions ("Ruling"). (R. 245) The court subsequently
entered an Order Amending Ruling and Order re: Sanctions that clarified portions of the
order in respects not germane to this appeal. (R. 290-292)
The Ruling stated a number of findings and conclusions, summarized as follows.
Henderson "violated numerous duties to his client, the Court and legal system, the public,
and to the profession," and specified the respects in which Henderson violated each of
these duties. (R. 246-247) Henderson's mental state was intentional with respect to his
violation of the rule requiring candor towards tribunals.

(R. 248)

Henderson acted

"intentionally, or at least knowingly, when he failed to comply with the tribunal's order to
file a Withdrawal of Counsel."

(R. 248)

Henderson's failures of diligence and

communication were knowing. (R. 249) Finally, Henderson caused potential harm to his
client, and actual harm to the court and the legal system, and at least potential harm to
the profession and the legal system. (R. 249-250)
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court determined that Henderson's
misconduct—his failure to notify Blakley that he had been suspended; his failure to notify
Blakley of a pending hearing; his failure to return the file at the termination of the
representation; his withdrawal nearly 20 months after being directed to do so; his failure
to comply with the previous suspension order despite filing an affidavit indicating he had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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done so; his misrepresentation to a tribunal; and his failure to inform the court of his
suspension—called for suspension as a presumptive sanction pursuant to Rule 4.3(a) of
the Standards. (R. 250-251)
The Ruling also identified six aggravating factors. (R. 251-254) Henderson has a
record of professional discipline: other discipline in 1988 and 1997, and a suspension in
2000 for similar rule violations including "failing to provide competent representation,
failing to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a false Affidavit."
(R. 251) Henderson committed multiple offenses. (R. 252) Henderson obstructed the
disciplinary proceedings by filing a late Answer, delaying in filing a discovery plan, failing
to provide initial disclosures, and failing to respond in a timely fashion to discovery
requests. (R. 252-253)

Henderson failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his

misconduct, arguing instead that he did nothing wrong.

(R. 253)

Henderson had

substantial experience in the practice of law, having been admitted in April 1970. (R. 253)
Henderson failed to make a good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his
misconduct. (R. 254)
The Ruling noted, but did not make an explicit determination concerning the OPC's
argument that Henderson's actions demonstrated a dishonest or selfish motive. (R. 252253) The portion of the Ruling rejecting Henderson's argument that nothing in the record
established his dishonesty or selfishness, however, noted that Henderson lied to the
tribunal and deceived his client, the tribunal, and opposing attorney by omitting the fact of
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his suspension. These actions are both dishonest and selfish." (R. 255) The court thus
rejected as a possible mitigating factor the absence of bad motive. (R. 255)
Similarly, the Ruling noted that Henderson presented evidence of good character,
but also the OPC's challenge of this evidence through a witness who reported Henderson
because of his actions. (R. 255) Elsewhere, it stated that "there is no evidence before
the Court to mitigate the presumptive sanction." (R. 255)
After weighing these aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court
determined that "there is no basis for a lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by
the Standards." (R. 255) In addressing Henderson's argument that he should receive a
public reprimand, rather than a suspension, the Ruling stated "The fact that his previous
suspension was for similar actions leads the Court to believe he has not learned from the
minimum suspension." (R. 255)
The District Court suspended Henderson for twelve months, but granted him leave
to petition the court to stay all but three months of it upon specific conditions involving
submitting his practice to supervision. (R. 256) If Henderson does not petition for a stay,
he must serve the entire suspension.

(R. 256-257)

To date, Henderson has not

petitioned the District Court to have his suspension stayed for a period of supervised
probation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the OPC's view, probation is not an appropriate sanction when an attorney
knowingly, or knowingly and intentionally, engaged in professional misconduct involving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dishonesty, particularly when there were significant aggravating factors including prior
discipline and obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings. Probation is a sanction that
should be reserved for professional misconduct that lends itself to correction, with a
respondent willing to cooperate, and not employed for conduct giving rise to questions
about the attorney's fundamental integrity.
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") identify and define
probation as a sanction for professional misconduct, but do not provide guidance
concerning when probation may or should be imposed. Compare Rule 2, Standards, with
Rule 4, Standards. The OPC considers probation a useful tool for correcting practice
errors that arise from ignorance or lack of diligence or communication. Conversely, the
OPC views probation unsuitable as a sanction for conduct involving knowing or intentional
dishonesty with clients or courts.

Consistent with this approach, the OPC last year

determined not to appeal a District Court decision imposing probation in a setting
involving negligence.
Recently, however, two District Court decisions have imposed or permitted
probation for severe breaches of the attorneys' duties of honesty in various aspects of
their practices. Although they differ in their particulars, each of the cases involved the
respondent's knowing and intentional dishonesty to clients, third-parties, or to a tribunal.
Because of its serious concerns about fairness to respondents and the desirability of
promoting consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for similar offenses, as
well as its concerns about protecting the public and the administration of justice, the OPC
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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seeks review of the District Court decision in this case and in In re Crawley, which has
been consolidated herewith.

The OPC asks the Court to articulate criteria for the

imposition of probations, thereby providing guidance to the OPC and the District Courts,
and urges some particular standards for the Court's consideration. Finally, if the Court
concludes that the District Court erred in permitting Henderson to petition to be placed on
probation, it requests that the Court reverse that portion of the Order, and require
Henderson to remain on suspension for the entire year-long period.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S GUIDANCE IS
IMPOSING PROBATIONS
A.

NEEDED CONCERNING CRITERIA

FOR

Appropriate Sanctions Are the Linchpins of an Effective Attorney
Discipline System, and Probation Has Its Place

An effective attorney discipline system depends upon appropriate and consistently
applied sanctions for professional misconduct.

The American Bar Association's Joint

Committee on Professional Sanctions stated it this way:
For lawyer discipline to be truly effective, sanctions must be based on
clearly developed standards. Inappropriate sanctions can undermine the
goals of lawyer discipline: sanctions which are too lenient fail to adequately
deter misconduct and thus lower public confidence in the profession;
sanctions which are too onerous may impair confidence in the system and
deter lawyers from reporting ethical violations on the part of other lawyers.
Inconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction or among jurisdictions,
cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary
systems.
I.A., Preface, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (as amended Feb. 1992).
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In Utah, the explicit purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are
unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional responsibilities."

Rule 1(a),

Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"); see also Rule 1.1, Standards. To this
end, the Court adopted the Standards in 1993. See Compiler's Notes, Standards.
The Standards constitute a system "designed for use in imposing a sanction or
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 1.3, Standards. They allow for
"flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct"
and are designed to promote consideration of all relevant factors and their appropriate
weight "in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline." Rule 1.3, Standards.
B.

The Standards Identify Probation as a Possible Sanction, But Provide
No Framework Concerning the Circumstances Under Which Probation
Is Appropriate

Rule 2 of the Standards is titled "Sanctions," and identifies discipline ranging from
the most to the least severe: disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, admonitions. See
Rule 2, Standards. The list of possible sanctions also includes resignation with discipline
pending, reciprocal discipline, and probation. See id. Each sanction is defined in the
rule, except for a short list of "Other sanctions and remedies" that includes restitution, the
assessment of costs, and the like. See id. As defined in Rule 2, "Probation is a sanction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or
nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement." Rule 2.7, Standards.
Another rule in the Standards identifies the circumstances under which
disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, and admonitions are the appropriate presumptive
sanction.

See Rule 4, Standards. Rule 4 does not offer guidance concerning when

probation is an appropriate sanction, nor does it identify the circumstances under which
the sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and reciprocal discipline should be
imposed.

See id.

Procedures for seeking resignations with discipline pending and

reciprocal discipline are identified by specific rules in the RLDD, but the RLDD do not
address probation. See Rule 21 (Resignation with Discipline Pending), RLDD; Rule 22
(Reciprocal Discipline), RLDD. Thus, probation is the only sanction other than the list of
"Other sanctions and remedies," with no corresponding rule in the Standards identifying
when it is appropriate, or a rule in the RLDD identifying how it may be imposed.
C.

Although Probations or Their Equivalent Have Long Been Available in
Utah, The Question of When to Impose Them Appears to Be a Matter
of First Impression

Probations or their functional equivalent—stayed suspensions1—were not explicitly
identified among the sanctions noted in the body of rules that preceded today's RLDD

1

Because a stayed suspension with conditions which, if not met, would trigger
reinstatement of the suspension, the OPC regards stayed suspensions as the
functional equivalent of probations. Courts and other tribunals do not appear to draw a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Standards, but were available under the Supreme Court's inherent powers. See e.g.
Rules of Conduct and Discipline of the Utah State Bar, effective Nov. 1931 (Board of Bar
Commissioners could recommend reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, and Supreme
Court may exercise its inherent powers and "take any action agreeable to its judgment");
Rules V and VI, section 51, Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
effective Mar. 1940.
The OPC's review of Supreme Court opinions concerning lawyer discipline
revealed only a handful of cases in which probation was imposed or alluded to, but none
in which the Court discussed criteria that would make probation an appropriate option.
See e.g. In re Stoddard, 793 P.2d 373, 374-375, 377 (Utah 1990) (suspension stayed
and probation imposed for unintentional lack of diligence, but attorney violated conditions
and probation was revoked); In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 807, 809-810 (Utah 1990)
(attorney intentionally converted funds belonging to one client as payment for a debt
owed by another client; Court imposed six-month suspension, with five months stayed on
condition of payment of restitution and costs);2 In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 262-263
(Utah 1992) (opinion alluded to attorney's probation by consent for what appear to have

more rigorous distinction between the two, and this Brief will not attempt to further
distinguish them.
2
Justice Stewart's opinion included a footnote stating that "a six-month suspension, even
if five months is stayed, is oppressive and unreasonable." Id. at 810 n.5. He added,
"Petitioner's conduct is not, in my view, that egregious." Id. He also cautioned that "it is
ill-advised to impose an over long period of suspension and then stay part of it to gain
leverage to compel an attorney to comply with other specific remedies. There are ample
means to compel compliance short of that." Id.
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been diligence and communication problems, but probation was revoked and this case
involved allegations of attorney practicing while suspended); In re Schwenke, 849 P.2d
573, 575 (Utah 1993) (opinion noted Court's acceptance of Bar recommendation to place
attorney on supervised probation for neglect of two matters; this case addressed
allegations concerning attorney's failure to comply with Court orders); In re Cassity, 875
P.2d 548, 548 (Utah 1994) (public reprimand and six months' probation for case
prosecuted as fee dispute).3
D.

The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions Include Probation as a Potential Discipline But Do Not
Provide Criteria for Employing It

Utah's Standards are a substantially revised and streamlined version of the
American Bar Association Standards for
Standards").

Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA's

See Summary, Standards; In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 212.

Their

purposes "are nonetheless the same." Babilis, 951 P.2d at 212.
The ABA's Standards identify probation among the possible sanctions for
professional misconduct.

See Standard 2.7, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions, as amended Feb. 1992. The language of the ABA's probation provision
differs from the one employed in Utah, but its effect is similar: "Probation is a sanction
that allows a lawyer to practice under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed
alone or in conjunction with a reprimand, an admonition or immediately following a
suspension.
3

Probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or

This case is discussed in greater detail below.
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reinstatement." Id. Notably, the ABA Standards do not include a suggested framework
for determining when probation is appropriate, nor do they offer guidance concerning
how it should be imposed.
E.

Probation Is Available In Most Other States, But the Criteria for
Imposing It Vary

With some exceptions, the disciplinary rules of other states include probation
among the range of sanctions available for attorney misconduct. The OPC has compiled
summary information concerning these rules.

See Summary Chart of State Rules

Governing Probations and Stayed Suspensions, a copy of which is provided in the
Addendum. Conceptually, the states may be divided into those in which probation is not
provided for under the rules governing attorney discipline but the courts sometimes
impose it pursuant to their inherent authority; those in which probation is available under
conditions specified in the rules; and those, such as Utah, in which probation is explicitly
provided for, but no criteria are identified in the rules.
1.

Some Jurisdictions Have Rules Permitting Probation Only When
Specified Conditions Have Been Satisfied

Jurisdictions with rules permitting probation often identify conditions that must be
satisfied before probation can be imposed. These often include a proviso that probation
may only be imposed if there is little likelihood of harm to the public. See e.g. Rule 8(h),
Ala. R. of Disciplinary Pro. Others include a proviso that the conditions of probation must
be adequately supervised. See e.g. Section 17E(7), Ark. Sup. Ct. Pro. of Regulating
Conduct of Attorneys at Law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Even where probation is permitted under certain conditions, the rules in other
jurisdictions usually are silent concerning the underlying misconduct and mental state for
which probation may be imposed. The exception is that a handful of rules in other
jurisdictions expressly limit probations to conduct that would not warrant disbarment. See
e.g. Rule 251.7, Colo. R. Civ. Pro. As far as the OPC can tell, Texas is the only state with
more finely calibrated criteria related to the misconduct itself. See Rule 15.11, Texas R.
of Disciplinary Pro. (probation cannot be used if respondent received public reprimand or
fully probated suspension in last five years for same rule violations, or two fully probated
suspensions in last five years, or received two public reprimands in last five years for
conflict of interest, theft, or failure to return clearly unearned fee).
2.

Reported Cases From Other Jurisdictions Sometimes Offer a
Useful Perspective on Probation as a Disciplinary Sanction

The OPC's search for reported cases involving probation as a disciplinary sanction
revealed numerous cases in which probation was employed without comment from the
court concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state that might
warrant such a sanction. Several cases were more helpful in articulating the courts'
reasoning, however, and these are summarized here.
In its first such decision, In re Jantz, the Supreme Court of Kansas4 considered
whether to stay the suspension of an attorney who converted client funds and lied to a
judge about it. See In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626, 772-773 (Kan. 1988) (noting that the

4

Kansas is a jurisdiction in which probation is not explicitly provided by rule.
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A

court had "not used probation nor have we 'suspended' the execution of such
suspension."). Pursuant to the Kansas Supreme Court Rules Relating to Discipline of
Attorneys, which provide for disbarment, suspension, censure, or informal admonition,
and "[a]ny other form of discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any type
of discipline stated above, . . . which the Supreme Court deems appropriate,"5 the
Kansas Supreme Court adopted the hearing panel's recommendation. See id. at 775776. The court emphasized, however, that the case was "unique" because of the many
mitigating circumstances,6 and noted that it had "rarely failed to disbar or suspend any
attorney whose professional misconduct parallels that of the respondent." Id. at 775.
The unique circumstances were these:
The conduct complained of here took place within a very short period of
time; there were no complaints against respondent prior to these
incidents.
These took place when respondent was under severe
emotional distress, caused by the terminal illness of his father and his own
financial problems. Mr. Jantz admitted his misconduct to the judge
promptly. He has admitted the misconduct to his client and to the bar
where he practices. He made prompt restitution of the funds, which were
not at that time due the client but were paid by him into the hands of the
clerk of the district court, to await further order of the court. By the time
the disciplinary proceedings were underway, Jantz had already made
restitution, had commenced professional counseling (which is continuing),
and had prepared a plan for retirement of his debts and financial
obligations. We were told at the time of oral argument that he has made a
substantial reduction of his obligations since the panel hearing in March of
this year. His practice is growing, indicating that he is accepted by the
members of the bench and bar as well as the residents of the community
where he resides and practices.

5
6

Rule 203(a)(5), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. Relating to Discipline of Attorneys.
Apparently there were no aggravating factors, either.
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Id.
Since then, the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected other requests for
probation, noting that "unique" circumstances are those "from which it reasonably could
be inferred that the attorney's misconduct was a one-time response to adversity and
that it would be highly unlikely that he would repeat his mistake."

See e.g. In re

Scimeca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1090 (Kan 1998) (indefinitely suspended respondent, among
other things, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and for
misconduct in dealing with clients, notwithstanding his contention that he suffers from
depression and is treating it, has filed personal and business bankruptcies, his son
suffers from a head injury, he apologized to the judge, and the incident involving the
judge was isolated).
In New Hampshire,7 the Supreme Court considered probation for an attorney's
trust account violations that involved among other things, commingling and failures to
maintain proper trust account records. See In re Morgan's Case, 727 A.2d 985, 987
(N.H. 1999). Although the attorney's "apparent ignorance of the rules cannot justify
their violation," the court concluded that the mitigating factors included self-reporting,
remedial efforts, stipulation to the facts, a lack of prior discipline, and absence of harm,
warranted a conditionally delayed suspension. Id. The court observed: "It is significant
that the respondent's actions were not motivated by dishonesty, for attorney misconduct

7

New Hampshire is a jurisdiction without an explicit rule providing for probation.
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involving dishonesty reflects most negatively on the legal profession and will not be
tolerated" Id. (emphasis added).
In Oregon,8 the Supreme Court rejected probation for an attorney's intentional
dishonesty with a client, noting that a condition of probation is only appropriate when
there is a correlation between it and the ethical violation. See e.g. In re Butler, 921 P.2d
401, 404 (Ore. 1996).

It concluded that "a lengthy suspension will provide greater

protection to the public." Id. More recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon "advise[d] the
Bar that we do not favor probationary terms unless they are the result of stipulation.
When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant a lengthy probationary
period, the uncertainties of the monitoring process lead us to prefer, when appropriate,
imposition of a sanction involving a concrete period of time." In re Obert, 89 P.3d 1173,
1181 (Ore. 2004).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota9 may grant probation, but "only [in] the most
extreme, extenuating circumstances," such as physical illness that precipitated a severe
depressive reaction which was causally related to the misconduct and had been
remedied; the misconduct had been rectified; there was no indication of fraud or deceit;
the attorney had made significant community contributions, and had no disciplinary
history. See In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. 1980).

8
9

Oregon has a rule providing for probation.
Minnesota's rules provide for probation.
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Probation is imposed infrequently in the District of Columbia,

and only when the

respondent's conduct was influenced by a remediable disability. See e.g. In re Bradbury,
608 A.2d 1218, 1219 (D.C. 1992); see also In re Stow, 633 A.2d 782, (D.C. 1993)
(probation appropriate for neglect of practice in light of respondent's acquiescence in
sanction).
F.

Probation Appears to Be Emerging As a Sanction Imposed Sua
Sponte By the District Court

Last year, the District Court imposed a one-year suspension upon an attorney
who violated various Rules of Professional Conduct in several client matters, but
granted the attorney leave to petition the court to stay all but three months on condition
that she undergo supervision for up to nine months.

See Ruling and Order Re:

Sanctions, In re Lang, Case Nos. 010910847 and 030908681, March 28, 2005, a copy
of which is supplied in the Addendum. The attorney had violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence),
1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(d)
(Misconduct), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). See id. at 1. With the exception of her failure
to respond to the OPC, none of the violations were intentional; some violations were
knowing, others were merely negligent. See id. at 5-9. There were aggravating factors
in the form of dishonest and selfish motives as to some misconduct; a pattern of
misconduct; multiple offenses; obstruction of the disciplinary process; refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; and substantial experience with

10

Minnesota's rules provide for probation.
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respect to some matters. See id. at 9-12. Mitigating factors were: absence of a prior
record (but this was accorded little weight); inexperience as to some of the matters; and
interim reform. See id. at 12-15. The court found that suspension was the presumptive
sanction, although it noted that disbarment might be justified and appropriate. See id.
at 15.
The District Court "wrestled with its options," in the face of "the recurring question
[of] just what sanction might give [the attorney] the best possible chance to make
fundamental changes that could substantially improve her prospects of practicing law
until retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of professional
misconduct." Id. at 15. The court explained its reasons for permitting the lawyer to
petition for a stay:
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As already
indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption of suspension
is overcome in this case in any way that would justify the lesser sanctions
urged by [the attorney].
Accordingly, the sanction must include
suspension, but the court firmly believes that a suspension of six months,
or even one year, without a more proactive component, will do anything to
change [the attorney's] professional conduct in the long term. There must
be a term of actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this
lawyer's misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a
period of supervised practice to give [the attorney] a chance to see how
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other counsel, and
the courts.
Id. at 15-16. Ultimately, the attorney successfully petitioned for the stay of suspension.
See Order Staying the Respondent's Suspension and Concerning the Respondent's
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Reinstatement to the Practice of Law Upon Termination of the Period of Suspension, In
re Lang, Civil No. 010910847, a copy of which is included in the Addendum.
Although it had urged a sanction other than probation, the OPC concluded the
District Court had not erred in imposing the suspension plus probation in the foregoing
case.

Indeed, the OPC has sometimes stipulated to proposals for a respondent's

probation when the misconduct originated from something that clearly could be
remedied and the OPC is also persuaded of the attorney's commitment to change and
to cooperate. For example, negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer
to "provide competent representation to a client;"11 negligent conduct in violation of the
rule requiring lawyers to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client;"12 negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.13 In such circumstances, where it
appears that appropriate additional training or mentoring would eliminate the problems
without further injury to any client, probation is arguably the most effective means of
securing long-term protection of the public. Significantly, progress can be reported,
measured, and verified if necessary, thereby adequately insuring protection of the
public, the courts, and the profession.

11

Rule 1.1, R. Pro. Con.
Rule 1.3, R. Pro. Con.
13
Rule 1.4, R. Pro. Con.

12
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G.

The OPC Urges the Court to Exercise Its Special Role in Governing the
Practice of Law By Providing the Guidance Requested

Pursuant to Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court "plays a special role in
governing the practice of law," which "includes overseeing the discipline of persons
admitted to practice law." In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). Trial court
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but the Court "reserve[s] the
right to draw different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court." Id.
Significantly, "[w]ith respect to the discipline actually imposed, our constitutional
responsibility requires [the Court] to make an independent determination as to its
correctness." Id. In one of the first cases brought under the new disciplinary scheme
inaugurated in 1993, the Court said, "Although we recognize as a general proposition the
district court's advantaged position in overall familiarity with the evidence and the context
of the case, on appeal we must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our
responsibility." Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213.
The Court has exercised this role in the past by providing guidance concerning
how the Standards should be applied. For example, in the Ince case, the Court noted
that "Although the new Standards are intended to preserve a measure of flexibility in
assigning sanctions, the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the uncertainty that
existed under the old rules.

Therefore, we offer the following guidance as to the

application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6 [of the Standards]."
In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (aggravating and mitigating factors must be
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significant to warrant departing from presumptive level of discipline set forth in
Standards).
Justice Durham's concurring and dissenting opinion in another disciplinary matter,
In re Johnson, elaborated upon the Court's role in attorney misconduct matters:
This court is charged by the Utah Constitution with the obligation to regulate
the practice of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding, and
initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah State Bar and to the district
courts, but we retain the final authority to oversee the system. When the
prosecuting entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the
appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the trial courts, or
at least fail to challenge it, we lend out constitutional authority to the finality
of the determination. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no
precedent for the disposition of other cases. Where a sanction is
challenged, however, this court undertakes a function that goes beyond the
review of an individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportionality, rules
of law, and guidelines for the imposition of sanctions that have general
application for the practice of law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules
of Professional Conduct and develop the principles of application that will
guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts.
In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, U 21 (Durham, J . , concurring and dissenting).

Justice

Durham also noted the trial courts' "more limited perspective on the disciplinary system"
and observed that "[i]t is not at all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the
trend of developing law turns out to be 'wrong' in the sense that this court will reject it and
opt for a different interpretation or policy." Id. at U 23.
It is in this spirit that the OPC seeks review of the Henderson case and its
companion case, In re Crawley. The Court's decision here will have a significant bearing
on future disciplinary cases, as well as the cases in issue here.
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II.

PROBATION SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT IS
AMENDABLE TO CORRECTION
A.

Probation Is an Appropriate Sanction for Some Misconduct

Consistent with the goal of protecting the public and the administration of justice,
probation is a means of ensuring that reform has occurred. Likewise, probation imposed
in conjunction with other sanctions and remedies, such as a requirement that the lawyer
attend continuing education courses, or work under the supervision of another lawyer,14 is
a significant tool for ensuring and maintaining high standards of professional conduct.15
The factors for determining when to use probation are a more difficult question.
Rule 4 of Utah's Standards identifies the presumptive sanctions for certain types of
misconduct, but does not include probation as an appropriate presumptive sanction.
See Rule 4, Standards. Accordingly, probation appears to be an appropriate final
sanction—that is, a sanction ultimately imposed upon consideration of the factors
identified in Rule 3 of the Standards, which include the duty violated, the lawyer's
mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and aggravating

14

Rule 2 of the Standards provides for the imposition of other sanctions and remedies,
including "a requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses." Rule 2.9,
Standards.
15
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has
observed that if probation is not available as a sanction for lawyers in need of supervision
but who could "perform useful services," the only choices are "suspension, which involves
an unnecessary deprivation of the lawyer's livelihood, or continuation of practice, which
involves a possible threat to the public." Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Longenecker, 538
So.2d156, 164 n.1 (La. 1989).
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and mitigating factors—but not a presumptive sanction.

See Rule 3.1, Standards.

Probation, then, is a legitimate ultimate solution, but when should it be imposed?
B.

The Factors Identified in Rule 3 of the Standards
Considered in Imposing a Sanction of Probation

Should Be

Although the Standards are brief, being comprised of just six rules, they are
nevertheless loaded with the criteria necessary for promoting a rational and thorough
consideration of all relevant factors.

Rule 3 is the rule that explicitly draws together

these factors:
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a
finding of lawyer misconduct:
(a) The duty violated;
(b) The lawyer's mental state;
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct;
and
(d) The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
Rule 3.1, Standards.

The sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and

reciprocal discipline are not governed by Rule 3 because the factors are inapplicable,
and they are addressed by explicit separate provisions of the RLDD. By contrast, the
factors identified in Rule 3 are readily applicable in probation settings, and probation is
not addressed by the RLDD. Accordingly, the Rule 3 factors should be considered in
imposing the sanction of probation, and these are discussed below.
Lawyers owe duties to clients, tribunals, the public, and the profession. These
are not set forth in the Standards, but are embedded in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. For example, duties to clients are inherent in the rules requiring an attorney
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to provide competent, diligent representation and adequate communication. See e.g.
Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, R. Pro. Con.

A lawyer has a duty to maintain the integrity of

the profession. See e.g. Rules 8.1 and 8.3, R. Pro. Con. Of particular significance for
this case, a lawyer also owes duties of honesty and candor to tribunals and opposing
counsel, as well as a duty of fairness to opposing parties. See e.g. Rules 8.4, 4.1, 4.4,
R. Pro. Con.
As to the relevant mental states, these are identified and defined in the
Standards:
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result.
"Knowledge is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or
purpose to accomplish a particular result.
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation.
Definitions, Standards.
Injury may be actual or potential, and its level can range from "serious" to "little or
no." See Definitions, Standards. Injury and potential injury includes harm to clients, the
public, the legal system, or the profession. See id.
The Standards set forth a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in Rule 6, and this Court has provided guidance concerning their
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existence and the weight they should be accorded. See Rule 6, Standards; see also
e.g. In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998).
C.

In the OPC's View, Probation Is Not Appropriate When the
Respondent Has Intentionally or Knowingly Violated Duties of
Honesty and Candor

Employing the Rule 3 factors, the OPC has concluded that probation should not
be available as a sanction when the duty violated was the duty to deal honestly with
clients, tribunals, or third parties, and when the lawyer's mental state in committing the
misconduct was knowing or intentional.

Further, probation is not appropriate when

certain aggravating factors are present, a point addressed later.
Any sanction should maintain respect for the profession and protect the public,
and should be sufficient to prevent recurrence of the misconduct and deter others from
engaging in similar misconduct. Moreover, the degree of discipline must correspond to
the gravity of the misconduct.

Collectively, the question is whether the discipline is

appropriate in light of the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the
disciplinary rule violations, the potential harm to the public, and the harm to the legal
profession itself.
With these considerations in mind, probations in disciplinary matters involving an
attorney's intentional or knowing dishonesty are inappropriate because the misconduct
reflects an absence of integrity that cannot be remedied with further training or
supervision. Moreover, a respondent's reform cannot be verified. Indeed, absent 24-
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hour supervision, a supervising attorney cannot possible know if there have been
further misrepresentations or other lapses of integrity.
The OPC's position derives in part from the seriousness with which the Court
has treated discipline matters involving an attorney's lack of integrity in a variety of
settings. See e.g. In re Norton, 146 P.2d 899, 900-901 (Utah 1944) (attorney "charged
with an attempt to deceive this court" by intentionally misrepresenting that an exhibit
had been admitted in evidence; although attempt was unsuccessful, the Court imposed
one-year suspension); In re Bybee, 629 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1988) (attorney's lack of
truthfulness and candor to a court warranted a suspension; such conduct, "if allowed
without proper restraint and punishment, would undermine our system of justice."); In re
Cassity, 875 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah 1994) (had Cassity's misrepresentation to a court
"been charged and prosecuted before the hearing as an independent act of professional
misconduct, disbarment or suspension may have been appropriate, but that was not the
case."). In his concurring opinion in Cassity, Chief Justice Zimmerman wrote,
Conduct such as Cassity's factual misrepresentation to the court
strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of the adversary system. The
importance of a lawyer's obligation of candor to the tribunal cannot be
overstated. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to be advocates for their
clients, not to be their co-conspirators. . . . It would ignore reality to
recognize that at times, cultural and economic pressures cause some
lawyers to forget the distinction. . . . But when such conduct comes to
light, I think it should be punished harshly to serve as continuing notice on
errant members of the profession that we will not tolerate it. Severe
punishment also assures the public that, despite the cynical teachings of
popular culture that lawyers are prostitutes in nice clothing fit only for
dinosaur food, in fact, lawyers are bound by rigid ethical standards which
are designed to preserve the integrity of the adversary system.
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Cassity, 875 P.2d at 552 (citations omitted) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
D.

Probation Should Only Be Available When Certain
Factors Are Not Present

Aggravating

Additionally, even in cases not involving misconduct based upon an attorney's
intentional or knowing violation of duties of honesty, probation would not be appropriate
when aggravating factors suggest that the respondent is unlikely to cooperate with the
OPC and has not demonstrated the self-awareness that is a necessary component of a
true commitment to change.

In other words, an attorney whose misconduct was

dishonestly motivated,16 who denies responsibility,17 who engages in deceptive
practices during the disciplinary proceeding,18 or who displays an uncooperative attitude
toward the proceedings,19 is an unlikely candidate for the rehabilitative possibilities
offered by probation.
III.

HENDERSON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION GIVEN
THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES VIOLATED AND THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
A.

Henderson Intentionally Misled the Tribunal

Henderson's lack of candor to the ALJ was intentional: he told the ALJ he had
withdrawn from the representation because his client's case had settled, but the case

Rule 6.2(b), Standards (dishonest motive is an aggravating circumstance).
Rule 6.2(f), Standards (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of misconduct is an
aggravating circumstance).
18
Rule 6.2(f), Standards (submission of false statements or evidence, or other deceptive
practices during disciplinary process is an aggravating circumstance).
17
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had not settled. This violation of Rule 3.3 was a failure of his most fundamental duty to
the tribunal and the profession.
B.

The Aggravating Factors Suggest That Henderson
Candidate for the Reform That Is the Goal of Probation

Is a Poor

As the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions noted among the aggravating
circumstances, Henderson had prior discipline, and indeed had been suspended for
similar violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct: "failing to provide competent
representation, failing to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a
false Affidavit." For this misconduct, Henderson was suspended for two years, with all
but six months stayed. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of
Suspension and Probation, In re Henderson, Civil No. 990910496, offered and
accepted as OPC Exhibit 1, a copy of which is reproduced in the Addendum. This was
entitled to significant weight in determining the appropriate ultimate sanction, among
other things because Henderson did not learn from it, and it is difficult to see how
Henderson's practices might benefit from another period of probation. Moreover,
Henderson was in violation of the previous order.

See In re Doncouse, 2004 UT 77 U

19 (to effectively deter future misconduct, penalty for violating order of suspension must
be more severe than original suspension).

19

Rule 6.2(e), Standards (obstruction of disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing
to comply with rules or orders is an aggravating circumstance).
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Henderson also obstructed the disciplinary proceedings in various ways and
refused to acknowledge his wrongdoing. How can someone with so little regard for the
system and so little self-reflection be a good candidate for a successful probation?
CONCLUSION
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary cases lies with this Court, and in light of
its unique role in regulating the profession, the OPC asks the Court for guidance
concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state for which probation is
appropriate. Such guidance will provide enormous assistance to the OPC, the District
Court, and future respondents, because it will promote consistency in sanctions for similar
types of misconduct.
If the OPC has correctly concluded that probation is inappropriate as a sanction for
misconduct involving an attorney's breach of the fundamental duty of honesty to clients or
the courts or third parties, particularly when there are significant aggravating factors
suggesting that the respondent attorney is not amenable to reform, the OPC asks the
Court to adopt this as a bright-line test for determining the availability of probation.
Additionally, if the Court concludes that the District Court erred in permitting
Henderson to petition for probation after a period of actual suspension, the OPC requests
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that the Court reverse that portion of the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions and impose the
full term of suspension upon Henderson.
DATED: August

2 ^

, 2006.

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Kate A. Toomey
Deputy Counsel
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ADDENDUM
Table of Contents
Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief
Rule 2.

Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 3.

Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions,
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 4.

Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 6.

Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment, In re
Henderson, Civil No. 040903585
Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions, In re Henderson, Civil No. 040903585
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order of Suspension and
Probation, In re Henderson, Civil No. 990910496, offered and accepted as OPC
Exhibit 1
Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions, In re Lang, Civil Nos. 010910847
030908681

and

Order Staying the Respondent's Suspension and Concerning the Respondent's
Reinstatement to the Practice of Law Upon Termination of the Period of
Suspension, In re Lang, Civil Nos. 010910847 and 030908681
Summary Chart of State Rules Governing Probations and Stayed Suspensions
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
2.1. Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer
upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in
professional misconduct.
2.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment terminates the individual's
status as a lawyer. A lawyer who has been disbarred may be
readmitted as provided in Rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
2.3. Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer
from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time.
Generally, suspension should be imposed for a specific period of
time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three
years.
(a) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less
may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability.
(b) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six
months may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 25 of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.4. Interim suspension.
Interim suspension is the
temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. Interim
suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 18 and 19 of the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.5. Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the
lawyer's right to practice.
2.6. Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the
lawyer's right to practice.
2.7. Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer
to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public
or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other
sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or
reinstatement.
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2.8. Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with
discipline pending is a form of public discipline which allows a
respondent to resign from the practice of law while either an
informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent.
Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in
Rule 21 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.9. Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and
remedies which may be imposed include:
(a) restitution;
(b) assessment of costs;
(c) limitation upon practice;
(d) appointment of a receiver;
(e) a requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or
professional responsibility examination; and
(f) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education
courses.
2.10. Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction on a lawyer who has been
disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory
body having disciplinary jurisdiction.

Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
3.1. Generally.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a
sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
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Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
4.1. Generally.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon
application of the factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following
sanctions are generally appropriate.
4.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the
court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud,
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.3. Suspension.
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the
legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a
legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.4. Reprimand.
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional
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Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.5. Admonition.
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the
legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise
identified in this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.

Rule 6. Aggravation
Sanctions.

and Mitigation, Standards

for Imposing Lawyer

6.1. Generally.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and
mitigating circumstances may be considered and weighed in
deciding what sanction to impose.
6.2. Aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a) prior record of discipline;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary
authority;
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(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled
substances.
6.3. Mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include:
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary
authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative
attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) good character or reputation;
(h) physical disability;
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance
abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or
mental disability; and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally
contributed to the misconduct; and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained
period of successful rehabilitation; and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence
of that misconduct is unlikely;
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided
that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and
provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice
resulting from the delay;
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental
disability or impairment;
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(m) remorse; and
(n) remoteness of prior offenses.
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6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following circumstances should not be considered as
either aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary
proceedings;
(d) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(e) failure of injured client to complain.
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Diane Akiyama, #7125
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801)531-9110

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

]I
I
I

J. Keith Henderson, #01459
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 040903585
Judge L. A. Dever

On March 2, 2005 the Utah State Bar's Office of Conduct ("OPC") filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment seeking judgment against Respondent for violating rules 1.1
(Competence),

1.4

(Communication),

1.16(d)

(Declining

or

Terminating

Representation), 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal), 8.4(d) (Misconduct), and 8.4(a) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. On April 11, 2005, Respondent's Response to Utah
State Bar Office of Professional Conduct Motion for Summary Judgment was filed
requesting the Court amend or withdraw the admissions deemed admitted. On April 25,
2005, the OPC filed it's Reply to Respondent's Response to Utah State Bar's Office of
Professional Conduct's Motion for Summary Judgment
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Based on the foregoing the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as to the misconduct phase of these proceedings.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 10, 1994, Mr. Blakley was involved in an on the job

accident ("Accident") when the truck he was driving overturned.
2.

Mr.

Blakley

retained

Mr.

Henderson to

pursue

unpaid

worker's

compensation claims that Mr. Blakley filed with the worker's compensation insurance
carrier, American Insurance Company ("American Insurance").
3.

Mr. Henderson knew that Mr. Blakley was pursuing a personal injury claim

against the other driver in the Accident.
4.

Mr. Henderson did not inform Mr. Blakley that a settlement in the personal

injury case could affect Mr. Blakley's worker's compensation claim.
5.

Around January 2000, Mr. Blakley's personal injury attorney settled the

personal injury claim against the third party defendant in the Accident.
6.

On or about February 3, 2000, Mr. Henderson filed an Application for

Hearing requesting a hearing before the Labor Commission for the State of Utah
("Labor Commission") regarding Mr. Blakley's unpaid worker's compensation claims.
7.

Prior to filing the Application for Hearing, Mr. Henderson failed to

determine the status of Mr. Blakley's personal injury case.
8.

On March 16, 2000, American Insurance filed an Amended Response to

Application for Hearing asserting a counterclaim for reimbursement for past payments
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and offset of future payments to Mr. Blakley because Mr. Blakley received settlement
proceeds from the defendant in his personal injury case.
9.

The Labor Commission set a hearing on Mr. Blakley's

worker's

compensation claim for June 2, 2000.
10.

Mr. Henderson did not give Mr. Blakley a copy of the Response to

Application Hearing or the Amended Response to Application for Hearing before June
2, 2000.
11.

On June 2, 2000, Mr. Henderson met with Mr. Blakley just prior to the

hearing and as they traveled to the hearing.
12.

Prior to and after the June 2, 2000 hearing, Mr. Henderson failed to fully

explain to Mr. Blakley how Mr. Blakley's settlement in his personal injury case would
affect his pending and future worker's compensation claims.
13.

At the June 2, 2000 hearing, Debbie L. Hann, the Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ") continued the hearing without date to see if the parties could reach a
settlement regarding the amount of compensation that American Insurance would
receive.
14.

After the June 2, 2000 hearing, Mr. Blakley did not hear again from Mr.

Henderson until he received Mr. Henderson's letter dated November 30, 2000, stating
that American Insurance had a right to the third party personal injury settlement and Mr.
Blakley was not entitled to recover a worker's compensation award.
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15.

On November 9, 2000, the Third District Court for the State of Utah

entered an Order suspending Mr. Henderson from the practice of law for two years, with
all but six months stayed.
16.

Mr. Henderson did not notify Mr. Blakley that he was being suspended

from the practice of law and could no longer represent Mr. Blakley.
17.

Mr. Henderson did not inform Mr. Blakley that he needed to get another

attorney or he would need to represent himself pro se in the matter.
18.

Mr. Henderson did not provide Mr. Blakley with a copy of his file.

19.

Mr. Henderson did not notify Mr. Blakley that the next hearing in his case

was set for February 27, 2001 and that Mr. Blakley should attend the hearing.
20.

On or about February 27, 2001, the ALJ conducted a status conference

hearing in Mr. Blakley's case.
21.

When Mr. Henderson did not appear at the February 27, 2001 hearing, the

ALJ telephoned Mr. Henderson.
22.

During the February 27, 2001 telephone conversation, Mr. Henderson

informed the ALJ that he had withdrawn from the case because the case had settled.
23.

As of February 27, 2001, Mr. Blakley had not reached a settlement with

American Insurance.
24.

During the February 27, 2001 telephone conversation, the ALJ directed

Mr. Henderson to file a withdrawal of counsel within ten days so the case could be
moved forward.
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25.

Mr. Henderson did not submit his withdrawal of counsel to the Labor

Commission until October 15, 2002.
26.

On December 27, 2004, the OPC served by mail discovery requests on

Mr. Henderson, consisting of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions, and Request for
Production of Documents.
27.

On April 11, 2005, Mr. Henderson served by mail Respondent's Response

to the Utah State Bar's OPC's Interrogatories, Response to Request for Production of
Documents and Discovery Requests Requests for Admissions dated April 8, 2005.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
Mr. Henderson's Motion for Withdrawal of Admissions
Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says that any matter admitted
under this Rule is conclusively established unless the court commits to withdrawal or
amendment of the admission. The case Langeland v. Monarch Motors sets out the
standard for determining whether or not it is proper to allow these matters to be
withdrawn or amended. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah, 1998). It says that Mr. Henderson must
show: 1) That the matter deemed admitted against him is relevant to the merits of the
underlying cause of action; and 2) Introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of
specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted are in fact untrue.

The Court

deduces the answers to the admissions are denied and that is all he says. The Court
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reviewed the answers to the interrogatories.

The vast majority of which says this is

information that has previously been supplied. The Court believes Mr. Henderson has
failed to meet the standard under Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
will not allow his submissions to be withdrawn.
OPC's Motion for Summary Judgment
Based upon the information before the Court and the admissions that have been
deemed admitted by the Court, summary judgment will be granted to Bar counsel in this
matter regarding rules 1.1, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.3(a), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as alleged by the OPC in its Complaint.
JUDGMENT
Based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters
summary judgment against Mr. Henderson as to Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five
and Six of the OPC's Complaint. A sanction hearing will be held on January 30, 2006
beginning at 2:00 p.m.

Entered this

<b
dayofo_f _ A\X^
W day
N X$
w mW
> 2 020 5 .
BY THE COURT:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of::

RULING AND ORDER RE: SANCTIONS

J. KEITH HENDERSON, #01459,

CASE NO. 040903585

:

Respondent.

:

The first part of this bifurcated matter was tried before the Court
on November 25, 2005.

The Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was

represented by counsel, Diane K. Akiyama. The respondent was personally
present and was represented by counsel, John T. Caine.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 13,
2005.
The Court found that Mr. Henderson had violated several Rules of
Professional

Conduct,

to

wit:

Rules

1.1

(Competence);

1.4

(Communication); 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation; 3.3
(Candor Toward the Tribunal); and 8.4 §§ (a) and (d) (Misconduct).
After the Court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the Court
commenced the sanctions hearing on January 30, 2006, the date agreed to
by the parties.
The respondent was present and represented by Mr. Caine and the OPC
was represented by Ms. Akiyama.
Testimony was taken, with witnesses appearing for both sides. The
Court having considered the testimony, exhibits, Memoranda and arguments,
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RULING

now enters the following Ruling and Order imposing sanctions upon Mr.
Henderson as a result of the violations previously adjudicated.
Pursuant to the Standards: "A disciplinary sanction is imposed on
a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that the lawyer had engaged in
professional misconduct."

Rule 2.1.

As indicated above, in this case

the determination of violations is based on this Court's Findings and
Conclusions, and not on any acknowledgment by Mr. Henderson.
The factors the Court must consider in imposing sanctions are set
forth in Rule 3.1.

They are: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's

mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
The Court believes that these factors, in the order stated, are a useful
framework for consideration of the appropriate sanction in this case:
DUTIES VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENT
Mr. Henderson violated numerous duties to his client, the Court and
legal system, the public, and to the profession.
Duties to clients:
with

respect

to

representation.
necessary

by

Mr. Henderson violated duties to his client

competence,

communication,

Mr. Henderson

filing

a

claim

lacked

with

the

and

termination

the thoroughness
Labor

of

reasonably

Commission prior

to

ascertaining the status of Mr. Blakley's personal injury case.
Mr. Henderson also violated his duty to Mr.
fully

explain

the impact

of

the personal

Blakley by failing to

injury

settlement, his
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RULING

suspension from practice on the worker's compensation matter and to
protect the client's interests upon his withdrawal of the representation.
Duties to the Court and legal system:

An attorney violates his

duty to the Court and the legal system when he submits misleading
information to a tribunal. Mr. Henderson violated his duty to the legal
system by knowingly misrepresenting to the Administrative Law Judge that
the worker's compensation case had settled when in fact it had not. He
also violated his duty by failing to timely file his withdrawal with the
Labor Commission and comply with the tribunal's orders.
Duties to the public: Mr. Henderson violated his duty to the public
by failing to abide by the procedural requirements of withdrawing from
the representation and by making a misrepresentation to the tribunal.
These actions violated his duty to the public to maintain the standard
of personal integrity.
Duties to the profession: His misrepresentation to the tribunal
violated Mr. Henderson's duty to the profession.

As noted in the trial

brief of the OPC, truth and candor are synonymous with justice, and
honesty is an implicit characteristic of the legal profession.

Mr.

Henderson's failure to promptly withdraw as required and later directed
by the ALJ also violated his duty to the profession.
MENTAL STATE OF THE RESPONDENT
Three mental states

(intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be

considered pursuant to the Standards, and the determination of which
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applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction for the
violation(s), as does the injury factor.

The three mental states are

defined in the Standards, as follows:
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result.
"Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result.
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow,
which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.
As pointed out in the brief of the OPC, Courts ought to evaluate the
attorney's mental

state based

upon

the

facts

and

the reasonable

inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Since the Court has already determined that Mr. Henderson violated
Rule 3.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court can infer
that Mr. Henderson's mental state of mind was intentional. The Court can
also infer that Mr. Henderson acted intentionally, or at least knowingly,
when he failed to comply with the tribunal's order to file a Withdrawal
of Counsel.

Mr. Henderson knew he was required to inform all courts,

opposing counsel, and clients that he had been suspended from the
practice of law.

Even after being directly ordered by the ALJ to file

his Withdrawal of Counsel, Mr. Henderson did not file his Withdrawal
until October 15, 2002, after he received the Bar Complaint.
Findings at 4-5, Nos. 24-25.
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It can also be inferred that Mr. Henderson acted knowingly when he
failed to adequately determine the status of Mr. Blakley's personal
injury suit and communicate with Mr. Blakley.

Mr. Henderson knew Mr.

Blakley was pursuing a third party claim against the driver in the
accident that was the basis of the worker's compensation claims.

See,

Findings at 2, Nos. 3-7.
ACTUAL AND/OR POTENTIAL INJURY CAUSED BY THE RESPONDENT
Utah's Standards provide that ''injury is harm to a client, the
public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a lawyer's
misconduct...."

"Potential injury is the harm to a client, the public,

the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening
factor

or

event, would

misconduct."

probably

have

resulted

from

the

lawyer's

Definitions, Standards.

Mr. Henderson caused potential harm to his client due to his lack
of competence and communication.

Mr. Blakley might not have chosen to

pursue the worker's compensation claim had he been aware of the effect
the personal injury settlement would have had on his claims.

Mr.

Henderson's failure to properly withdraw could have also harmed his
client's case.
Mr. Henderson caused actual harm to the Court and the legal system
when he failed to comply with the withdrawal of counsel procedural
requirements and the Order of Suspension, and later the ALJ's Order to
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RULING

The tribunal and opposing party incurred additional

time and expense to continue the hearing due to Mr. Henderson's failure
to properly withdraw.
The profession and the legal system were also at least potentially
harmed by Mr. Henderson's misleading conduct.

Honest conduct by officers

of the court is key to the maintenance of public trust in the profession
and the- legal system.
PRESUMPTIVE SANCTION
The Standards set forth presumptive sanctions for broad categories
of

misconduct,

circumstances.

absent
See,

the

existence

Rule 4, Standards.

of

aggravating

or

mitigating

Pursuant to the Standards:

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engaged in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d) , (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes interference or
potential interference with a legal proceedings; or
(b) engaged in criminal conduct that does not contain the
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 4.3, Standards.
of subsection

Mr. Henderson's misconduct falls within the ambit

(a) based upon his knowing misconduct in violation of Rule

8.4(a).
As noted in the Findings of Fact, previously made by the Court, Mr.
Henderson failed to notify Mr. Blakley that he had been suspended, that
he failed to notify Mr. Blakley of a pending hearing and failed to return

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

HENDERSON MATTER

PAGE 7

RULING

Mr. Blakley's file when he did withdraw, which withdrawal was nearly 20
months after being directed to do so.
Mr. Henderson failed to comply with the previous suspension Order
despite filing an Affidavit indicating he had complied.

He also made a

misrepresentation to a tribunal and failed to inform the Court of his
suspension even after being ordered to file a Notice of Withdrawal within
ten days.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Rule 6 (of the Standards) provides for the adjustment of the
presumptive discipline according to mitigating and aggravating factors.
A.

Prior Record of Discipline

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's
prior record of discipline. See, Rule 6.2(a), Standards. Mr. Henderson
has a record of discipline in the form of a suspension imposed in 2000
and other discipline imposed in 1988 and 1997.

Further, Mr. Henderson

was suspended in part for similar violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct including, failing to provide competent representation, failing
to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a false
Affidavit.
B.

Dishonest or Selfish Motive

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's
dishonest or selfish motive.

See, Rule 6.2(b), Standards.

The OPC

argues that Mr. Henderson's actions demonstrate a selfish motive when he
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failed to send and file the required notices to all parties in Mr.
Blakley's case that he had been suspended from the practice of law. As
a result of the action, Mr. Henderson failed to fully inform Mr. Blakley
of what needed to be done next, misled the tribunal about why he had
withdrawn from the representation and failed to timely file a Notice of
Withdrawal despite being ordered to do so within ten days. See, Findings
at 4-5, Nos. 16-25.
C. Multiple Offenses
The Standards recognize multiple offenses as an aggravating factor.
See, Rule 6.2(d), Standards.

Mr. Henderson's five violations of the

Rules of Professional Conduct constitute multiple offenses within the
meaning of the Standards.
D.

Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or
orders of the disciplinary authority."

Rule 6.2(e), Standards.

Mr. Henderson obstructed the disciplinary proceedings in this court,
which is now the disciplinary authority, by failing to comply with the
rules and the Case Management Order of this Court. Mr. Henderson filed
his Answer late, despite OPC's repeated agreements to give Mr. Henderson
until May 26, 2004, before it raised the matter with the Court and he
delayed the filing of the Stipulated Discovery Plan in this matter.

See,

Reply to Respondent's Response to Utah State Bar's Office of Professional
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Conduct's Motion for Summary Judgment.

RULING
Pursuant to the Case Management

Order, Mr. Henderson's initial disclosures were due to the OPC by August
16,

2004,

but

disclosures.

Mr.

Henderson

failed

to provide

OPC

his

initial

Further, the OPC served by mail discovery requests on Mr.

Henderson on December 27, 2004, but he did not respond to the OPC's
discovery requests within the 3 0 day period required by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
E.

See, Findings at 5, 26-27.

Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Misconduct

The Standards recognize as an aggravating

factor respondent's

''refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority."

Rule 6.2(g),

Standards. Mr. Henderson has not acknowledged the wrongful nature of his
misconduct. In fact, at the sanction hearing, he argued that he had done
nothing wrong in relation to the Blakley case.
F.

Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor the "substantial
experience in the practice of law." Rule 6.2 (i) . Mr. Henderson has been
a member of the Utah State Bar since April 20, 1971.

More experience

beyond his 2 9 years of experience would not have taught Mr. Henderson
more than he already knew about competent preparation and communication
with his client.
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Lack of Good Faith Effort to Rectify the Consequences

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's
"lack

of

good

faith

misconduct involved."

effort

to...rectify

the

consequences

of the

Rule 6.2 (j), Standards. Mr. Henderson failed to

make a good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct
in this matter. After failing to file his Withdrawal of Counsel, the ALJ
directed Mr. Henderson to file his Withdrawal within ten days, but Mr.
Henderson disregarded the Order for more than a year and a half.
Findings at 4-5, Nos. 24-25.

See,

He did not file his Withdrawal of Counsel

until after a Bar Complaint was filed by Mr. Blakley in this matter.
Further, Mr. Henderson never corrected the misrepresentation he made to
the tribunal when he filed his Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, nor did
he correct his inaccurate Affidavit in the disciplinary suspension case.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Rule 63 provides a list of mitigating circumstances to be considered
by the Court.
The respondent raises two of the factors listed in the Rule in
mitigation.
First, respondent's counsel argues that nothing in the record
establishes

dishonesty

or selfishness.

His position

is that the

respondent gained nothing from his actions, did not have a financial
benefit

and that

suspension

should be reserved

for attorneys who

misappropriate client funds or are convicted of a felony.
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This Court does not find that to be the standard to apply.

Mr.

Henderson lied to the tribunal and deceived his client, the tribunal, and
opposing attorney by omitting the fact of his suspension. These actions
are both dishonest and selfish.
Second, he presents evidence of good character from a practitioner
in the same field.

This evidence was challenged by an OPC witness who

testified that he reported the respondent to the Bar because of his
actions.
SUMMARY
After

weighing

the

aggravating

and

mitigating

circumstances

addressed above, the Court determines that there is no basis for a lesser
sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards.
The OPC argues for a suspension of three years or at the least, six
months.

The respondent argues for a public reprimand.

The problem with the respondent's suggestion is that there is no
evidence before the Court to mitigate the presumptive sanction.

The

argument that if respondent had been able to present his case, suspension
would not be the appropriate sanction is too late.
coupled

with

his

neglect

has

The fact of the

respondent's

acts

resulted

in

his

suspension.

The fact that his previous suspension was for similar

actions leads the Court to believe he has not learned from the minimum
suspension.
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With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the Court now
makes and enters its following:
ORDER/ suspending respondent J. Keith Henderson from the practice
of law in the State of Utah for a period of twelve months, effective
March 8, 2006, pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability.
The Court is imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Mr.
Henderson is hereby granted leave to petition the Court to stay all but
three months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Mr.
Henderson, at his expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah State
Bar who is generally experienced in litigation to act as supervisor and
mentor for a period of up to nine months. The supervision shall include
one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of files,
participation in court and discovery procedures, review of documents
prepared by Mr. Henderson, including specifically correspondence to
opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of Mr. Henderson's practice.
It is anticipated that the lawyer selected and who must be approved by
this Court shall spend approximately five hours per week with Mr.
Henderson (as an average), for up to nine months, but the specific time
shall ultimately be at the discretion of the supervising lawyer and at
a rate of compensation to be agreed between Mr. Henderson and the lawyer.
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If Mr. Henderson chooses not to petition for a stay, he shall serve the
full suspension.
At the end of the suspension period, Mr. Henderson may petition for
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability.
The Court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the final
Order of the Court, but either the OPC or Mr. Henderson may request the
Court for any modification or clarification that either may think
necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to effect the Court's
purposes set forth herein.
Dated this

jll

da

Y

of

February, 2006.

L.A. D
DISTRICT COURT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions, to the following, this
day of February, 2006:

Diane Akiyama
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John T. Caine
Attorney for Respondent
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Charles A. Gruber, #7391
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
UTAH STATE BAR
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I
In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

I
I

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND
PROBATION

I

CIVIL NO. 990910496
JUDGE: Sandra N. Peuler

KEITH J. HENDERSON, #1459
Respondent.

This matter was tried before the Court on September 26 and 27, 2000. The
Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by counsel, Charles A. Gruber.
The respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel, Gregory G.
Skordas. At the conclusion of trial, the Court took this matter under advisement and now
issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah

for approximately 30 years.
Stanley and Susan Spooner Complaint
2.

In 1993, Stanley and Susan Spooner retained the respondent to represent

them in a bankruptcy matter.

The main purpose of the bankruptcy filing was to

discharge tax debts for which the Spooners were being garnished. The respondent filed
the bankruptcy action too early to be able to discharge all of the Spooners' taxes.
Therefore, one year of taxes was not discharged. The Spooners thereafter continued to
be garnished by the I.R.S. for the one year of tax debt that was not discharged.
3.

During the bankruptcy proceedings, the respondent represented Susan

Spooner against Stanley Spooner in a divorce action. Although the respondent testified
that Stanley Spooner waived any conflict, the respondent did not obtain a written waiver
and in the divorce decree Stanley Spooner was ordered to reimburse Susan Spooner
for the tax debts which had been the subject of the bankruptcy proceedings.
4.

The Spooners sued respondent for malpractice and were awarded a

Judgment in the sum of approximately $11,000. During the course of the malpractice
litigation, the respondent filed an Affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment in which respondent alleged that the clients, themselves, made the decision
2
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to file the bankruptcy case early.

During the course of the same litigation at a later

deposition, the respondent admitted that he had made the error in the filing date.
5.

Judgment was entered against respondent in approximately June, 1997.

On August 10, 1999, respondent paid the Judgment, plus interest, in the sum of
$12,500.
6.

The Spooners filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar in

October, 1995. On September 30, 1996, the OPC sent a letter to respondent seeking
information regarding the Spooners' Complaint. The OPC sent a total of seven letters
to respondent before respondent replied to the Bar's request for information in July,
1998.
Richard B. Robinson Complaint
7.

The OPC received a Complaint from Richard B. Robinson regarding

respondent's representation of him on March 19, 1997.

The Bar first requested

information from respondent in a letter dated March 27, 1997.

Respondent filed a

response to their request July 27, 1997. The Bar thereafter filed an informal Complaint
against respondent October 25, 1998.
8.

Richard Robinson failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding the

substance of his Complaint.

3
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Lewis and Marie Henderson Complaint
9.

Lewis and Marie Henderson filed a Complaint against respondent with the

OPC on April 3, 1997. On June 11, 1997, the OPC sent a letter to respondent seeking
information regarding the above Complaint. The OPC sent five letters to respondent
before respondent replied to the Bar's request on July 31, 1998.

Lewis and Marie

Henderson failed to appear at the trial regarding the substance of their Complaint
against respondent.
Larry N. Jenkins Complaint
10.

Larry N. Jenkins filed a Complaint with the OPC on May 7, 1997. The Bar

sent a letter to respondent June 11,1997, seeking information and a written response to
Jenkins' allegations. A total of six letters were sent to respondent before he replied on
July 30, 1998.

Larry Jenkins failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding the

substance of his Complaint against respondent.
Lance L. Miller Complaint
11.

Lance L. Miller contacted respondent in March, 1997, regarding a wage

claim based upon his termination from employment.

Miller paid the respondent a

retainer of $204. Miller expected respondent to file his wage claim, but respondent did
not.

Respondent testified that he had declined to represent Miller, although he
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acknowledged that the statute of limitations provided only a 60 day period within which
to file a claim.
12.

Respondent took no action to protect Miller from losing his wage claim due

to the statute of limitations and also refused to return the retainer.

Respondent also

failed to return Miller's phone calls.
13.

Miller brought an action against respondent in Small Claims Court seeking

the amount of his wage claim, approximately $3,100, and the amount of the retainer,
$204. Ultimately, Judgment was entered against respondent only for the retainer.
14.

After the time ran for appeal, respondent paid Miller the retainer.

15.

Miller filed a Complaint against respondent on May 28, 1997. The Bar

requested information and a response from the respondent in a letter dated June 10,
1997. The Bar sent six letters to respondent, but respondent never complied with the
requests made in the letters.
Michael R, Dick Complaint
16.

From March, 1997 through July, 1997, the respondent represented

Michael R. Dick regarding a worker's compensation claim. During the four month period
Dick called respondent approximately 30 times, and the respondent called back only
two or three times.

5
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17.

At the end of March and again at the end of April, respondent assured

Dick that respondent's office was working on his file.

Toward the end of April,

respondent said that Dick's file was "getting big." In July, 1997, respondent met with
Dick, at which time Dick saw his file. The file contained only the same three or four
papers Dick had given him months earlier, but nothing else. Respondent testified that
he had wanted to delay his client's independent medical examination, so that he could,
ultimately, obtain more funds for his client. The delay, however, was not in accordance
with the client's wishes. Respondent also testified that he attempted to have his client
at Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry.

Respondent provided no documentation,

however, of any work done in the case.
18.

Thereafter, Dick sent a letter firing respondent. After Dick's new attorney

requested his file, respondent took three months to deliver the same.
19.

Dick filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar on July 23, 1997.

On August 18, 1997, the OPC sent a letter to respondent requesting information and a
response. The respondent thereafter failed to reply.
Michael Chouinard Complaint
20.

In December, 1996, Michael Chouinard retained respondent regarding a

worker's compensation matter.

In January, 1997, Chouinard filled out and signed a

form requested by the respondent. During the period of time from January through
6
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May, 1997, Chouinard telephoned respondent from Chouinard's home in Idaho 50 or
more times.

The respondent only spoke with Chouinard personally once or twice.

During this period of time, respondent advised Chouinard that the application for
hearing had been filed with the Industrial Commission. Chouinard thereafter contacted
the Industrial Commission and learned that the forms had not been filed. Respondent,
upon being contacted, acknowledged that his secretary had forgotten to file it, but that
he would do it immediately.
21.

During the summer of 1997, Chouinard again learned that the application

for hearing had not been filed. Chouinard called respondent five times per day, every
day, but could never get through to respondent. Respondent sent a letter to Chouinard,
dated September 24, 1997, indicating that the application for hearing had been filed.
However, the application for hearing was not filed until October 8, 1997. The respondent
explained that he had "submitted it for filing," which is not credible, based on the time
between the two events.
22.

Respondent testified that he arranged for a psychiatric evaluation for

Chouinard due to the client's complaint of headaches.

Respondent provided no

documentation of any work on Chouinard's claim, however.
23.

Chouinard testified that he requested his file when he fired respondent in

February, 1998, and that he did not receive all of his documents back. The respondent
7
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mailed documents to Chouinard's Washington attorney and then received a second
request from an attorney in Provo. No evidence was provided as to the time period that
elapsed between the request for documents and respondent's mailing to counsel in
Washington.
24.
18,

Chouinard filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar September

1997.

The

OPC

requested

information

and

a

response

on September 23, 1997. The OPC sent a total of five letters to respondent before he
filed a reply on July 29, 1998.
James Franklin Complaint
25.

In January, 1997, James Franklin retained respondent to represent him in

a criminal matter.

In February, 1997, Franklin's home was searched and various

personal property seized by the State.

In May, 1997, Franklin was served with a

forfeiture Complaint. Respondent appeared with Franklin on the criminal matter, but did
no work in the civil forfeiture action.
26.

Franklin testified that respondent had agreed to represent him in the civil

forfeiture case, although respondent denied that. Additionally, Franklin paid no retainer
or other monies to respondent for representation in the civil case.
27.

The Court allowed respondent to withdraw from representation in the

criminal matter and appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent Franklin.
8
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Franklin testified that he failed to appear on numerous occasions in the criminal matter
because respondent intentionally told him to appear on the wrong dates. Franklin
inissed numerous court dates over a period of time from May 23, 1997, until the case
was completed August 15, 2000. Several of Franklins' failures to appear occurred after
respondent was allowed to withdraw.
28.

The property seized in the civil forfeiture

action had a value of

approximately $30,000. Judgment was entered against Franklin in the civil forfeiture
case based upon a failure to respond.

Franklin thereafter attempted to represent

himself in setting aside the Default Judgment, which was unsuccessful. Franklin has
pot received the property or any funds representing the value of the property.
29.

Franklin filed a Complaint with the OPC on August 20, 1998. The Bar sent

a letter to respondent September 1, 1998, seeking information and a response
regarding that Complaint.

Respondent replied to the Bar's request September 14,

1998.
Diane Jones Complaint
30.

Attorney Diane Jones represented a plaintiff in a divorce action in which

the respondent was opposing counsel in 1996 (Trevino v. Trevino).
31.

In December, 1996, respondent failed to appear at a pretrial conference

held before the Commissioner.

Jones telephoned respondent, who had failed to
9
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calendar the pretrial, and respondent thereafter

appeared late for the

pretrial

conference.
32.

In March, 1997, respondent failed to appear at a pretrial conference with

the Judge. The pretrial conference had been scheduled and noticed to both counsel by
the court. Respondent did not appear because he was not able to resolve the case by
stipulation and anticipated Jones would simply obtain a trial setting.

The Judge

awarded attorney's fees to Jones from respondent as a result of his failure to appear at
the court hearing.

Respondent failed to pay the attorney's fees awarded until

September, 1998.
33.

The respondent had difficulty communicating with his client from the time

the Complaint was filed August, 1996, until the case was resolved approximately one
year later based upon his client's incarceration in California. Jones' client had to leave
her job three times to appear in court for the various proceedings. The case was
delayed based upon respondent's inability to communicate with his client, respondent's
failure to appear at court proceedings, and his failure to communicate with attorney
Jones.
34.

On May 12, 1998, Jones filed a Complaint against respondent with the

OPC. The OPC mailed a letter to respondent July 29, 2000, requesting information and
a response regarding the allegations. The respondent thereafter failed to reply.
10
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Guadalupe Trevino Complaint
35.

The respondent represented Guadalupe Trevino in a divorce action filed

by Ms. Jones in August, 1996.

On September 9, 1997, Trevino filed a Complaint

against the respondent with the OPC. The OPC sent five letters to respondent before
he replied to the Bar's request on July 14, 1998.
September 17, 1997.

The Bar's first letter was sent

Trevino failed to appear at trial to testify concerning the

substance of his Complaint. Jones testified that at the December pretrial, respondent
acknowledged he had had no contact with his client. Respondent testified, as noted
above, that based upon Trevino's incarceration in California, that communication was
difficult.
Ranae Johnson Complaint
36.

In 1996, Ranae Johnson retained respondent to represent her in an action
against her employer. On October 16, 1998, Johnson filed a Complaint
against respondent with the OPC. The OPC sent a letter to respondent
November 16, 1998, requesting information regarding the Complaint filed
against respondent by Johnson. Respondent thereafter failed to reply to
the Bar's request. Johnson failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding
the substance of her Complaint against respondent.

n
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Katrina Rose Complaint
37.

In 1987, Katrina Rose retained respondent to represent her in a divorce

action. On December 14, 1998, Rose filed a Complaint against respondent with the
OPC.

On January 11, 1999, the OPC sent a letter to respondent regarding the

Complaint and seeking information and a response. The respondent thereafter failed to
reply

to

the

OPC's

request.

Rose

failed

to

appear

at

the

trial

to

testify concerning the substance of her Complaint against respondent.
Based upon the above findings of fact, the Court now enters the following
conclusions of law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As to the Spooner Complaint, the respondent has violated Rule 1.1 in that

his filing date on the bankruptcy was erroneous, Rule 1.7 as to the representation of
Susan Spooner, which adversely affected Stanley Spooner regarding disposition of
debts, Rule 8.4 regarding respondent's filing a false Affidavit in the civil lawsuit brought
by the Spooners, and Rule 8.1 related to respondent's failure to comply with the OPC's
request for information.
2.

As to the Miller Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 regarding his

failure to file Miller's Complaint in a timely manner or counseling Miller about the need to
file before the statute of limitations ran, Rule 1.3 relative to respondent's failure to return
12
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Miller's phone calls, and Rule 8.1 regarding his failure to comply with the Bar's request
for information.
3.

As to the Dick Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 in that respondent

undertook no work on Dick's Complaint during the four month period of his
representation, Rule 1.4 based upon respondent's failure to communicate appropriately
with his client, Rule 3.2 for his failure to expedite the client's cause of action, and Rule
8.1 regarding respondent's failure to comply with the Bar's request for information.
4.

As to the Chouinard Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 based upon

respondent's failure to file the client's application for hearing for a period of
approximately

ten months,

Rule

1.4

for

respondent's failure

to

appropriately

communicate with his client and keep his client advised as to the status of the matter,
Rule 3.2 for failure to expedite the client's cause of action, Rule 8.1 for respondent's
failure to comply with the Bar's request for information, and Rule 8.4(d) for
misrepresenting the status of the application to his client.
5.

As to the Franklin Complaint, no Rules of Professional Conduct were

violated by respondent.
credibility.

This is based upon the Court's assessment of Franklin's

Franklin, for example, testified that he failed to appear on numerous

occasions in the criminal matter because respondent deliberately provided him with
incorrect dates. That testimony is contrary to respondent's testimony, as well as all
13
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other evidence the Court received in this case.

In addition, the Court notes the

inconsistencies as to retainers paid to respondent.

In the criminal case, Franklin

testified that he paid respondent a retainer fee. In the civil case, however, Franklin
testified he had paid nothing. Based upon the inconsistencies in Franklin's dealings
with respondent in the two cases, as well as his lack of credibility, the Court concludes
that respondent's testimony that he never represented Franklin in the civil case is
credible and accurate.

Therefore, none of the actions or inactions of respondent

relative to the civil matter are a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
6.

As to the Diane Jones Complaint, the respondent violated Rule 3.2 based

upon his failure to expedite the divorce matter, Rule 3.4 in that respondent failed to
appear at the Court ordered pretrial conference, thereby causing opposing counsel and
her client to appear without being able to take any action, and Rule 8.1 for his failure to
respond to the Bar's request for information relative to the Jones Complaint.
7.

As to the Guadalupe Trevino Complaint, the Lewis and Marie Henderson

Complaint, the Larry Jenkins Complaint, the Ranae Johnson Complaint, and the Katrina
Rose Complaint, the respondent violated Rule 8.1 based upon his failure to respond in
a timely manner to the Bar's request for information regarding the substance of the
Complaints.

Based upon the complainants' failures to appear at trial, all other

allegations raised by these complainants in these causes of action are dismissed.
14
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8.

As to the Richard Robinson Complaint, the Court concludes that

respondent violated no Rules of Professional Conduct.

The complainant failed to

appear at the trial, and therefore the substance of his Complaint is dismissed. In
addition to that, it appears that respondent promptly responded to the Bar's request for
information regarding that Complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING SANCTIONS
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to the
respondent's violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court now enters the
following Decision with regard to sanctions.
1.

Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,

generally the following factors should be considered: (a) the duty violated; (b) the
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
2.

The specific duties violated by respondent essentially fall into five

separate categories. In four cases, respondent failed to timely file his clients' petitions.
In the Spooner case, he erroneously filed the bankruptcy petition too soon. In three
other cases, he filed applications for hearing late, or not at all.
3.

The second area of specific duties violated by respondent are ten

separate instances of failures to respond to the Bar's request for information upon
15
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Complaints being filed. In each of these ten cases, respondent either failed to respond
to the Bar at all, or responded only after numerous letters had been sent over a period
of months.
4.

The third area of specific duty violated by respondent are three separate

instances of respondent's failure to communicate with a client and keep the client
advised of the status of the matter.
5.

In addition, in one case, respondent violated his duty of loyalty to a client

by representing one of his clients against the other. Respondent also failed to appear in
one case at a Court ordered hearing.
6.

As to the lawyer's mental state, the only evidence submitted to the Court

was respondent's testimony, which included his statement that he would become
irritated when a client or former client would file a Complaint against him, and that
during this time he had buried his head in the sand.
7.

As to potential or actual injury caused by respondent's conduct,

respondent caused actual injury to the Spooners in failing to properly calculate the time
at which their bankruptcy petition should be filed. The actual harm caused was the
continued garnishment of the Spooners by the I.R.S. for the tax debt that was not
discharged. Respondent also caused actual harm to Stanley Spooner against whom
respondent represented Susan Spooner in the divorce action, at the same time the
16
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bankruptcy action was pending. In the divorce action, Stanley Spooner was ordered to
pay the marital debts, which included the I.R.S. debt.
8.

In addition, respondent caused actual harm to Lance L. Miller, whose

cause of action on a wage claim was lost because the statute of limitations was allowed
to expire.

Respondent also caused potential injury in the sum of the retainer he

charged, $204.

Miller obtained this amount from respondent at a subsequent time

based upon a small claims action that Miller filed against respondent.
9.

Respondent also caused potential harm to Michael R. Dick and Michael

Chouinard, whose worker's compensation claims respondent failed to timely file. Their
subsequent attorneys were able to resolve the matters and both thereafter received
funds from their claims.
10.

Finally, respondent caused both potential and actual injury to the public,

the legal system and the profession by first failing to appear at a Court ordered pretrial
conference, and by failing and refusing to respond to the Bar's request for information
relative to ten separate Complaints.
11.

As to aggravating factors, the Court finds as follows:
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(a)

Prior record of discipline.

Respondent has a prior record of

discipline beginning 1987, and concluding in November, 1997. The majority of those
matters

fell

between August,

1988

and August,

1992, and

involved

cautions,

admonitions and private reprimands. Included in those are an April, 1989, admonition
for failure to communicate with a client, and February, 1991, an admonition for failure to
respond to the Bar's request for information relative to a Complaint.
(b)

Pattern of misconduct.

The Complaints filed in this matter and

heard by the Court include numerous failures to communicate with clients, to timely file
matters, and to respond to the Bar.
(c)

Multiple offenses. Twelve separate Complaints were filed in this

matter. Ten of those were substantiated, either in part or in whole.
(d)

Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to

comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority.

Respondent failed and

refused to respond to the Bar's repeated requests for information in ten separate cases.
(e)

Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct

involved, either to the client or the disciplinary authority.

Respondent testified that he

believed he had done nothing wrong, except for his failure to respond to the Bar's
requests for information.

Numerous witnesses testified that respondent had never

acknowledged any wrongdoing or apologized for his actions or inactions relative to their
cases.
(f)

Substantial experience in the practice of law.
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As noted above,

respondent has practiced law for approximately 30 years.
(g)

Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct involved.

On two separate occasions, respondent

required a Judgment to be entered against him before any restitution was paid to a
client.
12.

As to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds as follows:
(a)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. There is no evidence that

any of respondent's actions or failure to act were based upon dishonest or selfish
motives.

In fact, none of the duties that he violated appeared to benefit him in any

manner.
(b) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

In the Spooner and Miller cases,

respondent was ordered to repay the clients for their losses. He has actually paid
those amounts in the sum of over $12,000.
(c)

Remoteness of prior offenses. The respondent's prior disciplinary

history includes one admonition in 1997 for practicing law after failing to pay his Bar
dues in a timely manner.

With the exception of that admonition, all of his other

sanctions occurred from 1987 through August, 1992. As noted above, respondent has
been practicing law for approximately 30 years. There is no evidence of any prior
discipline before 1987, and there was a period of a number of years after August, 1992,
before further proceedings were filed against him.
(d) Time period of these Complaints. With the exception of the Rose and
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Spooner cases in which respondent represented the claimant in 1987 and 1993, all of
the other Complaints filed in this action resulted from respondent's representation of
clients from September, 1996, through July, 1997. It appears, then, that there were a
number of Complaints filed against respondent, but during a fairly brief period of time.
As noted above, respondent had had no Bar Complaints filed for a period of
approximately four years before these Complaints were filed.
13.

In determining appropriate sanctions, suspension is generally appropriate

when the lawyer's misconduct is knowing, while reprimand is generally appropriate
when the lawyer's misconduct is negligent.

The Court finds that the respondent's

misconduct as to failure to appear at a Court ordered hearing and failure to respond to
the Bar were actions taken knowingly. As to the first, the pretrial hearing was noticed to
both counsel by the Court with a directive that counsel appear.

Respondent

acknowledged that he knew about the Court hearing and determined not to go. His
reason was that he would not be able to accomplish anything, because he didn't have
his client's consent to resolve the matter. However, he made a conscious decision not
to appear at the hearing.
14.

As to the failure to respond to the Bar, the respondent testified that he was

aware of his obligation to respond to the Bar's requests for information relative to each
of the Complaints filed against him. He further testified that he did not respond. The
Court finds that the respondent knew of his obligation, and again made a conscious
decision not to comply.
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15.

As to the remaining violations, the Court finds that those are negligent

conduct as defined in the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
16.

It appears, then, that for two areas of violations, suspension is

presumptively appropriate, while reprimand is appropriate for the remaining violations.
The Court further notes, however, that based upon respondent's prior discipline
regarding his failure to communicate with his client, a more serious sanction is generally
appropriate, based upon his knowledge that such conduct is a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. In addition, based upon respondent's experience in practicing
law, his acknowledgment that he was aware of his duties, and his repeated violation of
them, the aggravating factors clearly outweigh the mitigating ones.
ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND PROBATION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT based upon all of that, the Court Orders
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.
All but six months of that period is stayed. When respondent is readmitted to practice
after six months, he should serve an additional 18 months of probation, to be
supervised by the OPC.
1.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the terms and conditions of his

probation are as follows:
That respondent should engage the services of a supervising attorney, to be
approved both by the OPC and the Court, who shall report as required by the OPC on a
regular basis on respondent's office management practices.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent shall demonstrate to the supervising attorney that there is a
procedure for insuring that all client requests for information are responded to on a
timely basis, a procedure for tracking filing dates, to insure that client claims are timely
filed, and a calendaring system to insure that court appearances are met.
2.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall complete an

office management class approved by the OPC.
3.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall be ordered to pay

costs of this litigation incurred by the OPC.
4.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall have no

violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
5.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall promptly respond

to any requests the Bar makes for information relative to future Complaints.
Pursuant to the Court's Motion, Counsel for the OPC has been directed to
prepare these Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and an Order reflecting this
Decision.
DATED this
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The first phase of this bifurcated proceeding was tried to the
Court on November 17, 18 and 19, and December 14, 2004.

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 20, 2004.
The' court ; found

that Ms. Lang

had violated' several

Rules -of

Professional Conduct, as follows: Rule 1.3 (diligence) as to the
Elsbury and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(b) (communication) as
to the. Elsbury, Willcut, and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(a)
(communication) as to the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule
8.1(b) (failure to respond to the office of Professional Conduct
regarding complaints) in the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters;
Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
in this case during the course of a deposition) in the Kelley
matter; and Rule 8.4(a) in all four matters, based on the findings
of

other,

specific,

violations

of

the Rules

of

Professional

Conduct.
After the court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the
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court commenced the sanctions hearing on January 13, 2005, within
the thirty days required by Rule 11(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and

Disability,

inadequate.

but

the

time

set

aside

for

hearing

proved

The sanctions phase was ultimately heard over several

days, concluding with the last arguments on March 22, 2005. Prior
to closing arguments, five witnesses were examined.
Professional

Conduct

was

represented

by

Kate

The Office of

A.

respondent was represented by Andrew B. Berry.

Toomey,

and

Based upon the

testimony of the witnesses during both phases of this proceeding,
the court's Findings and Conclusions, the arguments of counsel, and
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and applicable case
law, the Court now enters its following Ruling and Order imposing
sanctions against Ms. Lang as a result of the violations previously
adjudicated:
Pursuant to the Standards: XNA disciplinary sanction is imposed
on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer had
engaged in professional misconduct."

Rule 2.1.

As indicated

above, in this case the determination of violations is based on
this

court's

Findings

and

acknowledgement by Ms. Lang.

Conclusions,

and

not

on

any

It is true that, during the course of

the sanctions hearing, acting through counsel, Ms. Lang generally
accepted the findings without further argument.

Nevertheless, to

the extent there was any acknowledgement, it occurred only after
the court entered adverse findings, and such acknowledgement cannot

?
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be

considered

in

mitigation

of

the

violations

for

sanctions

purposes.
The factors the court must consider in imposing sanctions are
set forth in Rule 3.1.

They are:

(a) the duty violated;

(b) the

lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct; and
mitigating factors.
order

stated,

are

(d) the existence of aggravating or

The court believes that these factors, in the
a useful

framework

for

consideration

of

the

appropriate sanction (s) in this case:
(a) The duty

(duties) violated.

The duties violated
detail

in the

court's

are set forth above in summary, and in

Findings

entered December 20, 2004.

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

They will not be repeated in detail

here, except as necessary to explain the court's Ruling and Order
below.
(b) The lawyer's mental state r
(c) The potential

or

actual

and
injury

caused

by the

lawyer's

misconduct.
Three mental states (intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be
considered

pursuant

to the

Standards,

and

the

determination

of

which applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction
for the violation(s), as does the injury factor. The three mental
states are defined in the Standards as follows:
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish

3
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a particular result.
"Knowledge" (or "knowing") is the conscious awareness of the
nature of the attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the

conscious

objective

or purpose to accomplish

a particular

result.
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which
failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
lawyer would exercise in the situation.
The

Standards

also

provide

definitions

for

injury

and

potential injury, as follows:
'"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or
the profession which results from a lawyer's misconduct.

The level

of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury;
a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater
than "little or no" injury.
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the
legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the

lawyer's

misconduct, and which, but

for some

intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the
lawyer's misconduct.
The court has very carefully considered the mental state to be
ascribed to Ms. Lang for each of the adjudicated violations, and
the injury or potential injury resulting therefrom, if any.

4
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No one

mental state applies to all occurrences under the facts of Ms.
Lang's violations.

The court first determines that, with the

exception of the two violations regarding non-responsiveness to the
OPC, none of the violations includes conduct that could fairly be
deemed intentional.

The court will now consider the mental state

and resulting injury, if any, of each violation, by complainant:
In the Elsbury matter the court cannot determine that there is
sufficient evidence to find that the initial failure to locate and
forward

income verification,

etc. was knowing.

It is clear;

however, that in light of the evidence, there was a substantial
risk that the result would

follow

from Ms. Lang's

failure to

carefully investigate her files and question her staff, and it was
manifestly negligent conduct that resulted in actual injury to the
client

(the Order

to

Show Cause hearing

regarding

failure to

produce documents as ordered) as well as potential injury, had
Judge Henriod found contempt, which would probably have occurred
but

for the judge's

active questioning

at

the hearing

(which

constituted an intervening factor or event).
On the other hand, Ms. Lang's abandonment of her client at the
hearing on Order to Show Cause, when she sought to deflect any
blame from herself or her office, and place it on her client, was
knowing; that is, the conduct reflected a conscious awareness of
the facts and circumstances, but the court nevertheless does not
find a conscious purpose to abandon or harm the client; therefore,

5
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intent

is not present. Finally,

as to Mr. Elsbury, the court

determines that Ms. Lang negligently failed to inform him of his
options such that he could make appropriate decisions, particularly
regarding representation, and that this failure created significant
potential harm that would likely have become actual injury, but for
Judge Henriod's insistence that Ms. Lang represent Elsbury at the
hearing.
Mr.

The representation did not, in fact, substantially aid

Elsbury,

but

Ms.

Lang's

presence

helped

Judge

understand the circumstances and fairly allocate

Henriod

fault for the

failure to provide documents as ordered.
Ms. Lang's violations in the Willcut matter were primarily
knowing.

Despite Ms. Lang's testimony, the court is persuaded that

she knew that
information,

she

and

failed

that

to respond

she

did

not

to repeated
keep

Ms.

requests

Willcut

for

informed

sufficiently (with or without inquiry) to permit the client to make
informed decisions.
that

there

conflicting

is

no

client

The unusual feature of the Willcut matter is
evidence

of

actual

instructions,

injury,

shifting

and

given

objectives,

the
and

inconsistencies in Ms. Willcut's claims regarding the underlying
facts, the court cannot determine even potential injury resulting
from Ms. Lang's omissions.
The Kelley matter, which resulted in the court's determination
that Ms. Lang's conduct during the deposition of her client was
prejudicial to the administration of justice, was clearly a knowing

6
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act.

Ms. Lang claimed both ignorance of the rules of conducting

depositions

(based on inexperience) and misunderstanding of the

state of the law on some specific issues.

That may be so, but Ms.

Lang was inescapably aware of the nature and circumstances of her
conduct, as the deposition deteriorated into an unproductive and
argumentative exercise, even if she did not consciously desire that
result at the outset.

The conduct resulted in actual harm, in that

the deposition had to be taken again (part of the cost of which was
ultimately borne by Ms. Lang pursuant to court order), and actual
harm to the client (both Ms. Lang's and the opposing party), the
legal system and the profession, both of which were cast in an
unnecessarily bad light.
The Burch-Knowley matter encompasses several violations.

The

failure to move the matter to a conclusion, when it could have been
accomplished months earlier but for Ms. Lang's refusal to cooperate
in providing minimal legitimate discovery to the other side, was a
knowing act, but one which did not intend the resulting delay. Ms.
Lang did intend to be obdurate, because

she resented

opposing

counsel's request, but that still does not evince an intent to
cause delay. Nevertheless, delay inevitably occurred, and Ms. Lang
must have known of the circumstances that led to the delay.
While Ms. Lang was engaging in conduct that created delay, she
was knowingly not responsive to her client and she did not provide
information, particularly between late November, 2001, and March,
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2002, that either informed her client of the status of the matter
or permitted

the client to make decisions

existing circumstances.
in actual
increased
insofar

injury
child

as

the

consistent with the

All of the foregoing violations resulted

to the

client, primarily

delay

in obtaining

support, as well as injury to the profession,
opposing

counsel

was

placed

in

an

impossible

situation with his client, resulting in a loss of confidence and
termination before the matter concluded, and the reputation of the
profession suffered significantly in the eyes of both parties and
also the spouse of the child's father.
In both the Willcut

and Burch-Knowley

matters, the court

further finds that the failure to respond to the OPC requests for
information and answers to complaints was intentional.

The court

recognizes that as Ms. Lang's problems multiplied, she came to
believe that responses were futile (in fact, she apparently clings
to that belief

to

this

day) , but

this

conscious

belief

only

supports the finding that Ms. Lang accordingly made a conscious
decision to not respond.
Finally, the court has not addressed the inevitable findings
of violations of Rule 8.4(a), which follow from the findings of
other, more specific, misconduct.

The court believes that it is

not necessary to assign a mental state to these violations, but if
one is required, in each instance the mental state should comport
with the mental state assigned to the underlying misconduct.
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In summary, the court finds that failure to respond to the OPC
was intentional, most of the remaining violations were knowing, but
some were merely negligent, as set forth in detail above.
but the Willcut matter,

the violations

In all

created both actual or

potential injury, and the existence of actual injury predominates.
The court has found all three mental states, ranging from
intentional (but only for the failures to respond to the OPC which,
while important,

occurred after the underlying violations), to

negligent, but the most prevalent state is knowledge, or knowing.
The court has also found both actual and potential injury in all
but

one

matter.

Accordingly,

the

presumptive

sanction

is

suspension, and the court must now proceed to consider aggravating
and mitigating factors that may enhance or reduce the presumptive
sanction.
(d) The existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The Office of Professional Conduct argues several instances of
aggravating conduct, and concedes some mitigation.

Ms. Lang, of

course, argues substantial mitigation, and suggests that the only
possible aggravating factor is that there are four cases at issue,
but she nevertheless argues that these four cases do not establish
a pattern of misconduct.

The court has carefully considered the

arguments of both counsel, but in the interests of brevity, the
court will address only those factors which it deems to be truly in
controversy.
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1. Aggravating factors.
The court will first address factors listed in the Standards,
in the order listed, then consider any additional factors:
- Dishonest or selfish motive.

The court is persuaded that

Ms. Lang was dishonest in her excuses proffered to Paula Willcut;
dishonest in her blaming actions directed against opposing counsel,
primarily Joseph Bean; and selfish in her candidly stated intent to
protect herself at Mr. Elsbury's expense in the hearing before
Judge Henriod.

The court does not identify any other specifically

dishonest or selfish motive or conduct.
- Pattern of misconduct.

If four cases in which violations

are found (extending over a period of four to five years) do not
constitute a pattern, the court is not sure what would be required.
More to the point, the pattern is of similar misconduct, including
failure to communicate, blaming of clients and opposing counsel,
and refusal to accept responsibility for the lawyer's own actions.
- Multiple offenses.

See the preceding paragraph.

- Obstruction of the disciplinary process, etc.
findings of non-responsiveness
Lang's

admission

that

she

The court's

in at least two cases, and Ms.

still

believes

any

response

and

cooperation with the OPC to be futile establish this factor beyond
question.
Refusal

to

acknowledge

the

wrongful

nature

of

the

misconduct, either to the client or the disciplinary authority.
10
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The record fully supports such refusal to acknowledge, at least
until after the court determined certain specific violations, and
even then the acknowledgements were limited.

The greater concern

for the court, as will be addressed more fully below, is that even
when Ms. Lang appears to have a will to acknowledge and address
problems

in her professional performance,

she appears to lack

critical insight into her own conduct and the'thought processes
that have created, and to some extent, justified the conduct (that
is, in Ms. Lang's mind).
- Substantial experience in the practice of law.
problematic factor.

This is a

Ms. Lang now has nineteen years of practice.

She practiced ten or eleven years before the first violation, but
it is also true that Ms. Lang had very limited experience (at least
in 1997) in the areas of practice, and in the specific practice
activities, involved in the violations.

By 2001; however, when

several

Lang's

relevant

events

occurred,

Ms.

experience

was

considerably greater, and she had focused exclusively (as she still
does) in family law, and she should be held to the standard of an
experienced family law practitioner with respect to at least the
Burch-Knowley and Paula Willcut matters.
- The foregoing are factors drawn from the Standards, but the
court
Lang's

finds that the most troubling
manifest

inability

to

aggravating

understand

some

fundamental issues involved in her misconduct.
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factor is Ms.
of

the

more

As will appear in

the mitigation section, below, the court notes and commends Ms.
Lang for systemic changes that will undoubtedly prevent recurrence
of some of the violations, but those violations that arise from
lack of understanding of the advocate's role, a professional's duty
to put the client's interests above her own, and the professional
obligation to be candid and courteous with opposing counsel (and
not engage in dishonest or otherwise improper blaming behavior) are
troubling

characteristics

that

will

need

more

than

systemic

remedies.
2. The existence of mitigating circumstances.
- Absence of a prior record of discipline.

There is no prior

record, but this factor cannot be given great weight, because (1)
Ms. Lang's practice in family law was relatively new when the first
instance occurred,
violations,
filings.

and

(2) even this case, involving multiple

is a consolidation

of two separate

District Court

Accordingly, had the actions remained separate, at least

the violations in the later filing would have been preceded by an
earlier record of discipline.
- Inexperience in the practice of law.

This factor probably

applies fairly to the Kelley matter, and to a lesser extent to the
Elsbury matter, but not to the later violations.

The court also

notes that the inexperience

in the Kelley

of opposing

counsel

deposition, and her sometimes provocative conduct, are factors that
the

court weighs

in

considering

any

sanction

related
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to that

matter.
- Unreasonable delay in proceedings.

The court only addresses

this factor because it was urged by Ms. Lang's counsel throughout
the proceedings.

Delay can only refer to the Kelley matter, and

the court finds that all proceedings were timely initiated and no
prejudice resulted to Ms. Lang from the fact that the matter was
not ultimately adjudicated until more than seven years after the
deposition.

First, the initial delay resulted from Ms. Kelley's

reasonable decision to delay a disciplinary complaint until the
underlying litigation was concluded.

Second, the OPC acted with

reasonable speed and within all time limits imposed by statute and
rule. Third, ultimate disposition was significantly delayed by Ms.
Lang's

own

actions,

including

self-representation,

discovery, and consolidation of cases at her request.

dilatory

Finally, the

sole factual predicate was conduct during one deposition in 1997.
All parties and the court had benefit of the transcript as a full
record, and all attorneys present at the deposition (Ms. Lang, her
associate, Ms. Hayes, and Ms. Kelley) testified in court, and each
had a clear recollection of the incident; therefore, no prejudice
was shown.
- Interim reform.

As is alluded to above, Ms. Lang has made

substantial, and apparently effective, systemic changes.
changes include a message

Those

response and documentation protocol,

improved calendaring, and specific procedures regarding withdrawal
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as counsel. These steps are genuine and commendable, and the court
determines that it is unlikely that most of the communication or
withdrawal of counsel problems will recur.

The court makes this

statement mindful of the testimony of David Lee, because even Mr.
Lee, who is unapologetically adverse

to Ms. Lang, conceded that

she responded to all messages by at least the second request.

In

addition, Ms. Lang's billing records and her file in the Lee matter
confirmed

that messages were carefully documented

and promptly

returned.
In addition to systemic changes, Ms. Lang has attended the OPC
ethics

school,

regarding

and

deposition

also

attended

practice,

but

continuing
as

legal

addressed

in

education
the

next

paragraph, it appears to this court that not all lessons were well
learned.
- Imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

Ms. Lang was

sanctioned by the trial judge for her conduct in the Kelley matter,
and that sanction should have acted as a caution regarding conduct
in future

depositions.

After

reviewing

the much more

recent

Marlise Smith deposition (July 21, 2004), the court is persuaded
that some improvement has occurred, but viewed as a whole, the
Janaka deposition (at issue in the Kelley matter) and the Marlise
Smith deposition show a continuing failure on Ms. Lang's part to
understand both "the rules of defending a deposition, and perhaps
even more importantly, the rules and expectations of professional

14
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civility.

It appears that the trial court sanctions in the Kelley

matter taught a very narrow lesson, at best.
- Remorse.

Ms. Lang points to her remorse, but her counsel

had to concede that remorse delayed until trial is not a legitimate
factor

in mitigation,

and that

is the only

remorse the court

observed.
SUMMARY AND ORDER
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
addressed above, the court determines that there is no basis for a
lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards.

On

the other hand, based on the aggravating factors, and the court's
specific concern that beyond systemic adjustments, Ms. Lang appears
unlikely to address the core, underlying professional failings that
brought

her

to this point,

appropriate.

disbarment

might

be

justified

and

In fact, as the court has wrestled with its options,

the recurring question is just what sanction might give Ms. Lang
the best possible chance to make fundamental changes that could
substantially
retirement

improve

without

her

being

prospects
plagued

by

of

practicing

continuing

law

until

allegations of

professional misconduct?
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one
day, but the preferred

sanction is a one year suspension.

As

already indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption
of suspension

is overcome

in this case

in any way that would
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justify the lesser sanctions urged by Ms. Lang.

Accordingly, the

sanction must include suspension, but the court firmly believes
that a suspension of six months, or even one year, without a more
proactive

component,

will

do

anything

professional conduct in the long term.

to

change

Ms.

Lang's

There must be a term of

actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this lawyer's
misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a
period of supervised practice to give Ms. Lang a chance to see how
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other
counsel, and the courts.
With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the
court now makes and enters its following:
ORDER, suspending respondent Marsha M. Lang from the practice
of

law

in the

State

of

Utah

for a period

of

twelve months,

effective May 15, 2005 (to allow winding up, pursuant to Rule 26,
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability).

The court is, at this

time, imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Ms. Lang
is hereby granted leave to petition the court to stay all but three
months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Ms.
Lang, at her expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah
State

Ear,

who

is

generally

experienced

in

litigation,

and

specifically experienced in family law, to act as supervisor and
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mentor for a period of up to nine months.

The supervision shall

include one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of
files, participation in court and discovery procedures, review of
documents

prepared

by

Ms.

Lang,

including

specifically

correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of
Ms. Lang's practice.

It is anticipated that the lawyer selected

(who must be approved by this court1) shall spend approximately
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for up to nine
months, but the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion
of the supervising lawyer, and at a rate of compensation to be
agreed between Ms. Lang and the lawyer.

If Ms. Lang chooses not to

petition for a stay, she shall serve the full suspension.
At the end of the suspension period, Ms. Lang may petition for
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability.
The court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the
final Order of the court, but either the OPC or Ms. Lang may
request the court for any modification or clarification that either
may think necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to

1

The court will stringently consider the qualifications of any prospective supervising lawyer.
If Ms. Lang wishes, the court is willing to provide a list of possible candidates. These names will
not be persons the court has contacted, but merely experienced family law practitioners in whom the
court reposes confidence based on experience.
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effect the court's purpose as set forth herein.
Dated this 29th day of March, 2005.

ROBERT K. HILDER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

'I
I
)
)
)
)
)

Marsha M. Lang, #4995
Respondent.

ORDER STAYING THE
RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION
AND CONCERNING THE
RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEME
TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
UPON TERMINATION OF THE
PERIOD OF SUSPENSION

I

Civil No. 010910847

)

Judge Robert K. Hilder

The matter of the Respondent's Verified Petition for Stay of Suspension
and Imposition of Supervised Practice came on for hearing before the Court on
July 26, 2005. The Respondent, Marsha M. Lang, was present and represented
by Andrew Berry; the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC")
was represented by Kate A. Toomey.

The Court having read the Verified

Petition, the response filed by the OPC, and the Reply to the OPC's Response to
Petition for Stay and Supervised Practice submitted by Ms. Lang, and being fully
advised in the premises, does hereby enter its ORDER:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

The effective date of Ms. Lang's twelve-month suspension is May

1,2005.
2.

The Court hereby stays nine months of Ms. Lang's twelve-month

suspension, commencing August 1, 2005, upon the following conditions:
a.

During the nine-month period, Ms. Lang shall at her own

expense retain Gary Howe to act as Ms. Lang's supervisor and mentor.
b.

The

supervision

shall

include

one-on-one counseling

regarding practice matters, review of files, participation in court and
discovery procedures, review of documents prepared by Ms. Lang,
including specifically correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of
all aspects of Ms. Lang's practice.
c.

It is anticipated that Mr. Howe shall spend approximately

four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for nine months, but
the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion of Mr. Howe, and at a
rate of compensation to be agreed between Ms. Lang and Mr. Howe.
3.

The OPC shall publish notice in the next Utah Bar Journal that Ms.

Lang's suspension has been stayed subject to the conditions identified above.
4.

Ms. Lang may petition for reinstatement to the practice of law

pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), except
that the Court hereby abates the requirement that a suspended respondent
seeking reinstatement

must pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility

Examination.
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5.

Pursuant to Rule 25(c), RLDD, Ms. Lang shall serve a copy of the

petition for reinstatement upon the OPC, and the OPC shall publish notice of the
petition in the Utah Bar Journal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 25(d),
RLDD.

The OPC shall also notify the complainants pursuant to Rule 25(d),

RLDD.
6.

Pursuant to Rule 25(f), RLDD, after receiving Ms. Lang's petition for

reinstatement, the OPC shall either advise Ms. Lang and the Court that it will
stipulate to Ms. Lang's reinstatement or file a written objection to the petition.
7.

Pursuant to Rule 25(g), RLDD, if the OPC objects to Ms. Lang's

petition for reinstatement, the Court will conduct a hearing on Ms. Lang's petition.
If the OPC files no objection, the Court will review the petition without a hearing
and enter its findings and order.
Dated this / / " day oU&fy^

, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

^ortoteblRobert K. 'Hilder
Third Judicial District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of

, 2005, I mailed via

United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER STAYING THE RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION AND
CONCERNING THE
PRACTICE

RESPONDENT'S

OF LAW UPON

REINSTATEMENT

TERMINATION

THE

OF THE PERIOD OF

SUSPENSION to:
Andrew Berry
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
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Summary Chart of
State Rules Governing Probation and Stayed Suspensions
Jurisdiction

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

Stayed Suspension

Probation
Rule 8(h), Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that
probation is appropriate only in cases where there is little likelihood
that the respondent will harm the public during the period of
probation and where the conditions of probation can be adequately
supervised.
Rule 16(a)(3), Alaska Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, provides for
probation as a sanction.
Rule 60(a)(5)(B), Arizona Supreme Court Rules, provides that
probation may be imposed when there is little likelihood that
Respondent will harm the public during probation and conditions of
probation can be adequately supervised
Section 17.E(7), Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures of Regulating
Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, provides that prior to or
subsequent to the filing of a formal complaint, a panel of the
Committee may place the lawyer on probation for a period not
exceeding two years. Probation shall be used only in cases where
there is little likelihood the lawyer will harm the public during the
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised.

1

I

Not identified in rules as a sanction but are
ordered as "other requirements that the
Disciplinary Board deems consistent with the
purposes of lawyer discipline."
Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Does not stay suspensions based on compliance
with conditions
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California

General Standard 1.5(e), California Standards for Attorney Sanctions
for Professional Misconduct, addition of reasonable conditions, such
as supervision by a probation monitor may be reasonable and
appropriate in assessing compliance with any duties or conditions
imposed

General Standard 1.4(c)(1), California Standards
for
Attorney
Sanctions
of
Professional
Misconduct, provides that an execution of a
suspension may be stayed for a period of one to
five years only if the stay and the performance of
specified duties by the respondent are consistent
with Standard 1.3, regarding protection of the
public, courts, legal profession maintenance of
high legal standards, etc.

Colorado

Rule 251.7, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an
attorney may be placed on probation if they can demonstrate that
they are unlikely to harm the public during the probationary period,
can be adequately supervised, are able to practice law without
causing the courts and the profession to fall into disrepute, and have
not committed acts warranting disbarment.

Rule 251.7 allows probation to be imposed in
conjunction with a suspension, which may be
stayed in whole or in part (pursuant to Rule
251.6(b))

Connecticut

Delaware

District of Colombia

Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been
and has been ordered by the Court, in its
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline
discretion
to
fashion
whatever
discipline
necessary to protect the public
necessary to protect the public
Rule 20, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure,
Not identified in rules as sanction
provides for probation as a sanction.
Rule XI, Section 3(a)(7), Rules Governing the District of Columbia
Bar, may not be for more than three years. Imposed in lieu of or in Not identified in rules as sanction
addition to other sanctions.

Florida

Rule 3-5.1(c), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Respondent may be
placed on probation for a period not less than 6 months nor more
than three years or for an indefinite period determined by conditions
Not identified in rules as sanction
stated in the order. Conditions may include but are not limited to:
completion of a practice and professionalism enhancement program,
supervision by a member of the Florida Bar, etc.

Georgia

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction
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Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Rule 506(c)), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, only imposed in cases Rule 507(a)(1), Idaho Bar Commission Rules,
where there is little likelihood that the defendant will harm the public provides that suspensions may be withheld in
during the probation and the probation can be adequately whole or in part, contingent upon the defendant's
supervised.
observance of specified conditions
Rule 772, Illinois Supreme Court Rule, imposed only in cases where
the attorney has demonstrated that he is unlikely to harm the public
during the period of rehabilitation and the necessary conditions of Not identified in rules as sanction
probation can be adequately supervised. Attorney cannot have
committed acts which warrant disbarment
Rule 23 Section 3(c), Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the
Discipline of Attorneys, in cases of misconduct or disability, the Court
No identified in rules as sanction but it appears
may, in lieu of disbarment or suspension place an attorney on
that Rule 23 Section 3(c) allows the Court to
probation and permit the attorney to continue practicing law if in its
"stay" a suspension and place the attorney on
opinion such action is appropriate and desirable. The attorney will be
probation. If the attorney violates the conditions
subject to the conditions and limitations as the Court sees fit to
of probation they may be suspended.
impose and upon violation of such conditions the attorney may be
suspended or disbarred.
Rule 34.13, Rules of Procedure of the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board, provides for a deferral of "further proceedings
pending the attorney's compliance with conditions imposed by the Not identified in rules as sanction
board for supervision of the attorney for a specified period of time not
to exceed one year unless extended by the board

Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, Rule 203, Kansas
Supreme Court Rules, Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of
discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any other
discipline that the Supreme Court deems appropriate

3

|Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however,
Rule 203, Kansas Supreme Court Rules,
Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of
discipline or conditions separate
from or
connected to any other discipline that the
[Supreme Court deems appropriate
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Kentucky

Louisiana

Rule 3.380, Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, does not
specifically provide for probations but rather public reprimands
Not identified in rules as sanction
and/or suspensions with conditions. The "with conditions" clause
has been used to probate sanctions.
Rule XIX, Section 10(A)(3), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, probation should be used only in cases where there is
Not identified in rules as a sanction, they have
little likelihood that the respondent will harm the public during the
developed jurisprudential^
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised

Maine

Not identified in rules as sanction

Maryland

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction
Not identified in rules as sanction
*

Massachusetts

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

i

Rule 9.106
Michigan Court Rules allows
reprimands or suspensions with conditions as the
hearing panel, the board, or the Supreme Court
may impose. In practice panels are more likely to
issue a reprimand with conditions than probation.

Michigan

Rule 9.121(C), Michigan Court Rules, provides for probation when
during the subject period the attorney was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and the impairment caused or substantially
contributed to the conduct. Probation must not be contrary to the
public interest and cannot exceed two years.

Minnesota

Rule 15(a)(4), Minnesota Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility, upon conclusion of the proceedings the Court may Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the
place the lawyer on probationary status for a stated period or until Court routinely imposes stayed suspensions, and
further order of the Court, with such conditions as the Court may even imposed one stayed disbarment.
specify and to be supervised by the Director.

Kuie o(D)(iii), Kuies or Discipline lor me Mississippi btate bar,
Mississippi

provides for suspensions with or without probation for a fixed period Not identified in rules as sanction
nf timp

Missouri

Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the Missouri Bar and the
Judiciary, lawyer is eligible for probation if he or she is unlikely to Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the
harm the public during the period of probation and can be adequately Missouri Bar and the Judiciary, Probation
supervised; lawyer must be able to practice law w/o causing courts provides that probations must be imposed in
or profession to fall into disrepute; and cannot have committed an act conjunction with suspension that may be stayed
warranting disbarment. Must be imposed for a specified period of in whole or in part
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Montana

Rule 9(C), Montana Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement,
allows lawyer to be placed on probation for such time and conditions Not identified in rules as sanction
as are determined to be appropriate.

Nebraska

Rule 4(A)(3), Nebraska Disciplinary Rules, provides for probation in
Not identified in rules as sanction
lieu of or subsequent to a suspension.

Nevada

Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are routinely imposed by Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are
agreement and/or contested hearing and are upheld by the Supreme routinely imposed by agreement and/or contested
hearing and are upheld by the Supreme Court
Court

New Hampshire

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

New Jersey

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

New Mexico

Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing Discipline, if the
record discloses that the respondent can still perform legal services
with proper supervision the Supreme Court may impose probation or
other conditions as a type of discipline by itself or may defer the
effect of the sanctions specified in subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, or 4
(regarding disbarment, suspension, indefinite suspension, or public
censure).

Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing
Discipline, provides that the Supreme Court may
defer
the effect
of sanctions, including
suspensions.

New York

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

North Carolina

Not identified in rules as sanction

General Statutes of North Carolina section 8428(c)(2) allows for suspension for a period of up
to five years, any portion of which may be stayed.

North Dakota

Ohio

r\uie ^f.o^a;, nuiui udKUid r\uiyb IUI Ldwyui uibupmiu, piuviuus IUI
probation in cases where there is little likelihood that the attorney will Not identified in rules as sanction
harm the public during the supervised period and the conditions of
Rule V, Section 6.(B)(4), Rules for the Government of the Bar of
Rule V. Section 6. (B)(3) Suspension from the
Ohio, probation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme
practice of law for a period of six months to two
Court determines, but only in conjunction with a suspension pursuant
years subject to a stay in whole or in part
to division (B)(3) of this section.
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Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been
and has been ordered by the Court, in its!
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline
discretion
to
fashion
whatever
discipline
necessary to protect the public
necessary to protect the public
Rule 6.1(a)(v), Oregon State Bar Rules of
Rule 6.2(a), Oregon State Bar Rules of Procedure, upon
Procedure, a suspension for any period in BR
determination that an attorney should be suspended the trial panel
6.1(a)(iii) or 6.1(a)(iv) which may be stayed in
may stay the suspension in whole or in part and place the attorney
whole or in part on the condition that designated
on probation for a period no longer than three years.
probationary terms are met
Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Subchapter G
section 89.291 repsondent attorney may be placed on probation if
they have demonstrated that they can perform legal services and will
not cause the legal profession to fall into disrepute; are unlikely to Not identified in rules as sanction
cause harm to the public during the period of probation; the
necessary conditions of probation can be adequately supervised;
and are not guilty of acts warranting disbarment.
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the Court can and does
Court can and does enter disciplinary orders
enter disciplinary orders imposing conditions that are tantamount to
imposing conditions that are tantamount to
probation
stayed suspensions

South Carolina

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

South Dakota

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement,
the imposition of a suspension may be suspended in conjunction
with a fixed period of probation. Probation shall be used only in
( cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the
public during the probationary period and where the conditions of
probation can be adequately supervised.

Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee
Rules of
Disciplinary
Enforcement,
indicates that a
suspension may be stayed in conjunction with
fixed period of probation.

Tennessee
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Texas

Vermont

Administrative Order 9, Rule 8(A)(6), Vermont Supreme Court
Administrative Orders and Rules, Probation may be imposed only in
conjunction with another sanction, reinstatement from disability,
reinstatement from disbarment, or suspension. Shall be used only in Not identified in rules as sanction
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the
public during the probation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised.

Virginia

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Washington

E L C 13.8, Washington Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Discipline, a
respondent who has been sanctioned under 13.1 (disbarred,
Not identified in rules as sanction
suspended, or reprimanded) or admonished under 13.5(b) may be
placed on probation for a fixed period of two years or less.

West Virginia

Rule 3.15(1), West Virginia Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides
Not identified in rules as sanction
for probation.

Wisconsin

L

Rule 15.11, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that
fully probated suspensions shall not be used in cases where the
respondent received a public reprimand or a fully probated
suspension within the last five years for violation of the same 2.25 and 3.14, Texas Rules of Disciplinary
rule/rules; the respondent received two or more fully probated Procedure,
allow
for stayed suspensions.
suspensions within the last five years; or the respondent received Disbarments may not be stayed.
two or more public reprimands or greater within the last five years for
conflict of interest, theft, misapplication of fiduciary property, or the
failure to return a clearly unearned fee.

Wyoming

Not identified in the rules as a sanction, although the Court
occasionally imposes "conditions on continued practice."
Not identified in rules as sanction except as may be appropriate
under the terms of a diversion contract pursuant to Section 14,
Wyoming Disciplinary Code

Not identified in rules as sanction
Stayed suspension cannot be longer than five
years pursuant to Section 4(a)(ii), Wyoming
Disciplinary Code

*This chart was prepared in August 2006 based upon information provided to the O P C by its counterparts in other states.
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